A VINDICATION

Of the REVEREND

D——— B———y,

FROM

The ſcandalous Imputation of being Author of a late Book,

INTITLED,

Alciphron, or *the minute Philoſopher*.

To which is ſubjoined,

The PREDICTIONS of the late Earl of *Shaftsbury* concerning that Book.

Together with an APPENDIX and an Advertiſement.

There ſeems to be a certain Way of Writing, whether good or bad, Tinſel or Sterling, Senſe or Nonſenſe, which being ſuited to that Size of Underſtanding that qualifies its Owners for the minute Philoſophy, doth marvelouſly ſtrike and dazzle thoſe ingenious Men, who are by this Means conducted they know not how, and they know not whither. Theor. of Viſ. explain'd, P. 6.

LONDON,
Printed and ſold by A. MILLAR at *Buchanan's* Head, opposite to St. *Clement's* Church in the *Strand*.
M. DCC. XXXIV.

A Vindication of the Reverend D--- *B---y*, &c.

In a Letter to a Friend.

PART I.

SECT. I.

I'M extremely obliged to you, my dear Friend, for your contributing so much to render my present Retirement in this remote Country agreeable, by the kind Advices you are pleased to send me now and then, of whatever passes among you at *Edinburgh*.

Your last gave me no small Surprize: You tell me, our ingenious Author, whose Manner of Writing we used so much to

admire, has publiſh'd a new Book in the Dialogue-way, in Defence of Religion and Chriſtianity againſt the Gentlemen, commonly called *Free-thinkers*; in which he turns out, *Quantum mutatus ab illo!*

I had heard before, from a Friend at *London*, of a Book on ſuch a Subject in the Preſs, written in that Manner, and by that Author: And you may be ſure I had form'd great Expectations of it, from the Opinion you know I always had of his former Manner of Writing, of his uncommon Penetration, his Depth of Thought, his maſterly Way of Reaſoning, and beautiful Manner of Expreſſion, and particularly the admirable Talent he ſeemed to have in Dialogue-writing. I could expect no leſs than that from ſuch a Pen muſt proceed a maſterly Vindication of Things I always was of Opinion might be made to appear very reaſonable, if the Cauſe was undertaken by ſome better Hands than ſeverals who have of late been managing it: That a Book written by D. *B*——*y* on ſuch a Subject, and in ſuch a Manner, could not fail to contain all the Strength of Argument needful to convince the Attentive, and all the Beauty of Stile and Manner pro-

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per to engage the Attention of every one: That the Doctrines and Precepts of Religion and Christianity ſhould be ſet forth in the cleareſt Light, and with the ſtrongeſt Evidences and Enforcements: That the moſt ſubtile Cavils of Infidels ſhould be fairly canvaſſed and thorowly expoſed, while their Perſons and Arguments ſhould be treated with all the Candor in the World: And, in fine, that the Book ſhould be a finiſhing Stroke in the long Conteſt the Defenders of our Religion have had with theſe ſame Infidels; and be a ſtanding Monument of the Strength of the Cauſe of Religion, and of the Weakneſs of Infidelity, while the *Engliſh* Language laſted.

I leave it to you, my Friend, to think how great muſt be my Surprize, to be informed by ſo good a Judge that I was to expect nothing of all this: That I ſhould have my ingenious and agreeable Writer quite to ſeek in this Performance: That I ſhould be abſolutely at a Loſs to diſcern any Marks in it of that Hand, which long ago wrote ſuch incomparable Dialogues; had not the Author ſubjoin'd a new Edition of the ingenious *Eſſay on Viſion*,

Vision, which in the former expressly bore the Name of *G. B.* and referred to it in this Work as his own Performance: How was I surpriz'd to be told by you, that, as to the Manner of managing his main Argument, I should neither find the Strength of the christian Cause laid open, as it had been already discovered in a Number of known Authors who had written upon it; nor the Strength of its Adversaries, such as it is, fairly represented; or their Arguments honestly stated, as they themselves had laid them down: But, instead of this, should be entertained with a deal of secret Apocryphal History, of certain Infidels in *Utopia*, whom I had never hitherto heard of in this our World; some who pretend to have *found out a Demonstration against the Being of God* *; some who would have the Impudence to say in good Company, that they knew *most ingenious Men who abhor the Notion of a God* ‡, &c. That, instead of such fair Dialogue as might be a just Picture of real Conversation among Men of some Sense and Manners, and might

* Advert. p. 2. and V. 1. p. 43. ‡ I. 235.

might be expected from one who had been ſo long and ſo much converſant with *Plato* and the other Ancients, I ſhould find the groſſeſt and moſt bare-faced *booty-writing*: And, in fine, that inſtead of that uniformly agreeable and lively Stile, I might expect, I ſhould find only ſome bright Paſſages, and ſome ſhort Sketches of Dialogue in the *Platonick* Manner, here and there, like the ſcattered Shreds of Purple-cloth *Horace* ſpeaks of in ſome wretched Performances.

Never did the juſt Opinion I have of your Judgment concerning fine Writing, meet with ſuch a ſhock: Never was the Regard I have always found Ground to pay to your Sentiments in Matters of Argument, put to ſuch a Trial. How much did I long for an Opportunity of judging for myſelf in this Affair, when you ſhould be ſo kind as to fulfil your Promiſe, of ſending me the Book by the firſt ſure Hand? What Hopes did I flatter myſelf with, of even finding you not a little miſtaken, and being able to ſet you right in ſome Things?

I could not but be particularly ſhock'd with the Account you gave me of his Manner of treating the late Earl of *Shafts-*

bury,

bury, and his Writings. 'Twas amazing to hear, that, not ſatisfied with repreſenting him as a Sceptick with Regard to Revelation, and attacking him in that View, he ſhould fall foul of his Notions concerning Virtue, his Plea for diſintereſted Love, his Repreſentations of the Beauty of moral Characters, the το καλον and το πρεπον. Could this be the Man who, I thought, had got into ſo familiar an Acquaintance with *Plato*, and the other Ancients! But further, to confound me, I was told, that he treated that incomparable Writer as a hair-brain'd Enthuſiaſt, endeavouring to play the Buffoon, and force an aukard Ridicule on his admirable Stile; nay, ſpared not even his moral Character, but was at Pains to depretiate his Virtue and Honeſty in the moſt invidious Manner. Good God! ſaid I to myſelf, muſt it always be the unhappy Fate of Religion and Chriſtianity, to ſuffer more by being betray'd by its pretended Friends, than by the Attacks of its moſt virulent avowed Enemies? Shall it ever be the Misfortune of the beſt of Cauſes, to meet with ſuch aukard Defenders! who know ſo ill to diſcern what is for it and what is againſt it; who know ſo ill

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how to diſtinguiſh the hearty Friends to the main Deſign of Religion and Chriſtianity, who may yet be miſtaken or doubtful about ſome particular Points of leſſer Importance, from the worſt of Enemies, ſuch as by their vicious Lives, as well as their unfair Attacks, ſhow that they hate the Light; or, ſuch as by their unconquerable Attachment to the Intereſt of this World, are led to ſubſtitute in the place of original and genuine Chriſtianity ſome Schemes of their own patching up, that may be more favourable to ambitious or covetous Deſigns.

§ II. I was going on in a very grave Mood, with ſuch Reflections as theſe, when I was interrupted with a Noiſe in the Staircaſe; and immediately bounces in to my Cloſet my mad Couſin *Tom Ratle*, booted as he was; and without ever offering to ſalute me, repeated in a ſeeming Extaſy, the following Lines

* *Sup-*

* *Suppose no cruel Accident of Jealousy,*
No Madness or Infamy of Love,
Yet at the Foot of the Account you'll find
That empty, giddy, gaudy, fluttering Thing
Not half so happy as a Butterfly,
Or a Grashopper on a Summer's Day:
And for a Rake, or Man of Pleasure,
The Reckoning will be much the same.

Heyday, *Tom*, said I, what's in the Wind now trow? But he, without seeming to mind me, pulls a Book out of his Pocket, and read as follows ‡:

We are dazled indeed with the Glory
And Grandeur of Things here below.
But I am apt to think if we know what
It was to be an Angel for one Hour,
We should return to this World, tho' it were
To sit on the brightest Throne in it
With vastly more Loathing and Reluctance
Then we would now descend
Into a loathsome Dungeon or Sepulchre.

Well

* Vid. Alciphron V. 1. P. 143. Compare 312, &c.
‡ Alciphron Vol. 1. P. 261.

Well *Tom*, ſaid I, I ſee thou'rt the old roving Spark ſtill: But prithee a Truce with thoſe Raptures and this Poetry a little, and tell how all Friends at *Edinburgh* do; or let me know, at leaſt, what Book haſt thou got there, which ſeems to put every Thing elſe out of your Head? O! the pureſt Book in the World, ſaid he.

Read this Book once, and you need read no more,
For all Things elſe will ſeem ſo mean and poor, &c.

You pretend, ſaid he, to be given to Divine Contemplation and Self-converſe, and ſit lolling on your Elbow in a mopping Manner, when you might learn from this Book, that you need but keep your Eyes open and ſtare about you, to maintain immediate Converſe with Heaven. Would you hear (I mean would you ſee) God ſpeak: Do but look into that Looking-glaſs there, and you ſhall ſee him tell you a L——. For Heaven's Sake *Tom*, ſaid I, no Blaſphemy I beſeech you; ratle about every Thing elſe, ratle upon myſelf as much as you pleaſe, but pray ſpare Heaven. Prithee, ſays he, none of your ſolemn affected Airs now: Blaſphemy, quotha! What do you take yourſelf

to be? You pretend to be ſo ſqueemiſh, forſooth, as to venture to call that Blaſphemy which I have juſt learned from an eminent and orthodox Divine, which is a Part of his main Argument to prove that there is a God, and that he really ſpeaks to us, becauſe he ſuggeſts to us real Matters of Fact, or not, as he pleaſes: Nay, don't you ſtare now: I tell you he is a Divine of the firſt Rank in the Church of *E*——, who has written an admirable Defence of Chriſtianity, and there has taught me this wonderful Diſcovery, and a great many rare Diſcoveries more, which will make me an Overmatch I hope for your Gravity. You have often endeavoured to face me down with telling me, "Would any Man of "Senſe talk at the Rate I did on ſome Sub-"jects? Would ever ſuch Ratle paſs in "tolerable Company?" But I find here that other Sort of Things than ever I took upon me to ſtumble you with, are ſpoken in the beſt of Companies; and there is more to be ſaid againſt your Fundamentals themſelves than you are aware of, and leſs to be ſaid for them too than you would pretend, or ſome very great Divines have not yet found it out; and ſure, *Si pergama dextra defendi*

defendi posset, dextra hac (claping upon his Book) *defensa fuisset.* You talk very boldly, *Tom*, said I, pray who has furnished you with all this Assurance? Do you really think to put it upon me, now, that any Christian, let alone a Clergyman, would utter such Things as you tell me? Or, if you have been silly enough, when you have found in some Christian Writer a Recital of such shocking Expressions of thoughtless Infidels, to take them for the Author's own Words; must I be so simple as to be led into so gross a Mistake by you? Why then, to confound you at once, said he, there is my Book, D. *B*'s *Alciphron*, which your Friend ——— gave me to bring to you; and, tho' you know I don't deal much in reading on such Subjects, yet having been some Nights by the Road alone, and having no other Way of entertaining myself of an Evening, I run over a great Part of this Book, and there found these Discoveries that so much startle you: Look you there, says he, turning up and pointing to Volume I. the Bottom of Page 234, and the Beginning of Page 235.

I knew

I knew not what to ſay, for ſome Time: But, at laſt, recovering out of my Surprize; *Tom*, ſaid I, you may eaſily believe you have ſtirred my Curioſity ſo much, that I had much rather be left to entertain myſelf with this Book than have any more at preſent of the beſt of your Converſation: Therefore let me beg you to get ſome Refreſhment below; and then entertain yourſelf with the reſt of the Family, or ſome Plays you'll find in the Hall till Dinner-time: He did ſo; and next Morning left me for good and all; ſo that I have now got Leizure to read over the Book you ſent me, with ſome Care and Attention; tho' I own this was giving myſelf no ſmall Mortification.

PART II.

SECT: I.

I Had gone but a little Way in reading over the Book, when I perceived how widely you was mistaken in your Conjecture, or imposed upon in the Information you had got, concerning the Author; and was vastly surprized to find you so far out, as I think I had scarce ever found you before in any Thing: And the more I read on, and considered the Matter, I was the more confirmed in this Persuasion; and convinced it was impossible that D. *B*——*y* should be the Author of this strange Raphsody of Dialogues. I ask't *Tom*, whom I found you had led into this Mistake, what Authority he had besides, for ascribing this Book to a Clergyman, and particularly to such a one: He told me, *common Fame:* Why, *com-*

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mon Fame, ſaid I, is oft-times a *common Liar*; and I'm perſuaded will be found ſo in the preſent Caſe.

I am aware of what may have led you, and a great many others, into this Miſtake; and indeed is the only Thing I can ſee to give any Handle to it, *viz.* what you yourſelf mention, as your great Evidence for it; that the Author of this Book has thought fit to publiſh together with it, *The Eſſay towards a new Theory of Viſion*; which, in the firſt Edition, expreſly bore the Name of *G. B. M. A.* &c. and *Euphranor*, the principal Speaker, eſpouſes the Sentiments of that Piece, and argues upon them, as his own. But, as it is plain *Euphranor* is not the Name of the Writer of the Book, for that is *Dion*; ſo, was it not eaſy for any one who had a Mind to expoſe D. *B*——*y*, and through his Sides wound the whole Clergy and our common Chriſtianity, to make uſe of this little Art, to paulm ſuch a Book upon the World as his? Yea, even to have gone further, and expreſly call'd it His, had he not been afraid to be call'd in queſtion for that; which, therefore, we find he durſt not venture upon; but ſatisfy himſelf with

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ſneaking Method to make it paſs for his; at the ſame Time reſerving to himſelf a ſafe Retreat, ſhould he ever be found out and called in Queſtion for it. But, however, ſuch a Trick might impoſe upon the many; I can't help being ſurpriz'd that you, my Friend, ſhould be miſled by this *ſingle Circumſtance*, lying againſt the *numerous internal Marks*, which might ſtare any one in the Face, in the Book itſelf, to prove that it is not, cannot be, the Production of ſuch an Author. I find myſelf obliged, now, to lay theſe particularly before you, to open your Eyes a little. If by this Means I ſhould ſomewhat humble you, and put you a little out of Conceit with your own Judgment: I hope, as a Recompence for this, I may reconcile you to D. *B*——*y*; and bring you in Conceit again with your once favourite Author.

§ II. In the *Firſt* Place: I'm ſure you knew very well long ago, that D. *B*——*y* was a great Maſter in the Dialogue-way of Writing; and might have reckon'd that a Genius which long ago diſcover'd itſelf to be ſuch an extraordinary one, could not fail to improve in that Way, by ſo

long and clofs an Application to the Study of the Ancients as he has fince given himfelf to: You might have known, that whenever he fhould fet himfelf to write Dialogues again, he would carefully preferve the Decorum, and the different Characters of Perfons; that the Opponents fhould be made fairly to reprefent the whole Strength of their Caufe; and the Defenders to ufe them with Civility, and make all juft Allowances to the Plaufiblenefs of the Objections they brought. But what do you fee, of all this, in the Medley of Dialogues now under Confideration? Is there any Thing, either of the Plaufiblenefs of the Schemes and Pleas of Infidels, or of the Strength of the Chriftian Caufe, fairly reprefented and truly ftated? What a Confufion of Characters is there? Tho', at the firft, he feems to draw *two* Characters of Pleaders for Infidelity; are they not often *one and the fame*, thro' the Courfe of the Book; fo as we have no Marks to diftinguifh them by, but their different Names? Nay, are they not made to play Booty oft-times, and fay Things, which, did not the Names tell us otherwife, every one would take for the Speeches of their

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Antagoniſts? How ſtrangely are all Sorts of Free-thinkers jumbled together? And how unfairly are the ſeveral Schemes and Arguments his Defenders of Religion and Chriſtianity (if we'll believe him) have to anſwer, repreſented? As a Balance to this: How weakly is the Side the Author eſpouſes, defended? And how groſs an Incapacity does he ſhow of drawing any of the Perſonages he brings together in his Dialogue-piece, or ſupporting any of the Characters he has ſet forth? How little Acquaintance does de diſcover with the Subject, about which his Dialogues are written; and what either might be, or had in Fact been ſaid often, either on one Side or other of the Argument?

It would be endleſs to go through all the Inſtances of theſe eſſential Defects, in the very Art of Dialogue-writing, that run from Beginning to End of this tedious Collection of Dialogues. I ſhall only take ſome particular Notice of the *third* Dialogue, which is, for the moſt Part, a pretty odd one, and makes a very aukward Part of a Defence of Religion and Chriſtianity. Our Author ſeems there eſpecially, to have happily light upon the Knack of what Mr. *Ad-*

diſon ſomewhere calls the *unanſwerable Way of Writing*, *i. e.* Writing ſo as every One ſhall be at a Loſs to know what you would be at, or where to have you. Our Author's Men of Straw, whom he ſets up to be pelted by his *Euphranor* and his *Crites*, are ſo like No body, that there is No body like them, and repreſent the Principles of thoſe who would maintain, "That Virtue "is a Reality in itſelf, independent of "Will and Conſtitution;" in ſuch a Manner as, I dare ſay, never one of the ſillieſt that has undertaken to ſtand up in Defence of theſe Principles ever did; tho' there may be ſilly enough Creatures eſpouſing the very beſt Principles. What wretched Stuff does he attempt to palm upon us, as a Repreſentation of the Sentiments of thoſe who extol the Beauty of Virtue, its native Charms and natural Allurements? His *Alciphron* is introduced talking in the Clouds, ſhifting and doubling in ſo wretched a Manner, as I'm ſure you and I, my Friend, have never met with, amongſt the moſt looſe and unthinking Creatures who pretend to be Diſciples of my Lord *Shaftſbury*; and Heaven knows we have met with ſome who pretend to that Character,

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as little to the Honour of that admirable Moralist, as some pretend to the Christian Name to the Honour of its divine Founder, and who pervert the best Things in his Writings, as these do in the Gospel, to the worst Purposes. Indeed one who is the least acquainted with the Manner in which my Lord *Shaftsbury*'s Scheme has been stated and defended by any who have wrote upon it, far more any one who is acquainted with the incomparably clear and strong Manner in which that noble Author (if I may yet venture to call him so*) has set it furth himself, must find it hard to imagine it could be that Scheme our Author had in View to attack, and be at a Loss to understand whose Notions of Virtue and its Beauty he designed to expose, was it not for the abusive Treatment of this great Man under the Name of *Cratylus*, which is introduced in this Dialogue. Of which more afterwards.

Had our Author intended to act a fair Part in this Matter; or had he dared to venture upon the Strength of his two dough-

*Alciphr. I. 311.

doughty Combatants, his *Euphranor* and his *Crites*, might he not have condeſcended to make his *Alciphron* ſpeak as my Lord *Shaftsbury* himſelf ſpeaks, and ſtate his Scheme as he ſtates it? Or, if the Light in which he ſets it was too ſtrong for his Moon-blind Eyes, could he not have borrow'd a Sketch of his Principles from ſome who have eſpouſed and defended them in their Writings? Eſpecially ſeeing he thought fit to borrow from that Quiver his beſt Weapons againſt the *Fable of the Bees*, in the preceeding Dialogue; as may be evident to any who will be at the Pains to compare it with the three Papers publiſhed among *Hibernicus*'s *Letters*, written by the ingenious Mr. *Hutcheſon*: Or, in fine, if he found himſelf incapable of underſtanding my Lord *Shaftsbury*'s Principles, as ſtated either by himſelf, or by any of his Diſciples; was there any Obligation upon him to write about what he did not underſtand? Or, at leaſt, to ſay any more about it, but that "He did not underſtand it?" Which muſt have been enough to expoſe it, with ſuch as are well acquainted with the vaſt Reach of the penetrating *Dion*: Had he not, by

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blundering ſo round about a Meaning through this whole Dialogue, ſhown that he did not underſtand it, for a Reaſon which muſt hinder him from underſtanding any Thing he has not a Mind to underſtand.

Perhaps it may be ſaid, That had our Author thought fit to ſtate my Lord *Shaftſbury*'s Principles, concerning Virtue and moral Beauty, fair ly and impartially, the World had loſt all the fine Wit and Raillery contain'd in this Dialogue, there had been no Place for all that high Ridicule, which *Euphranor* and *Crites* play off upon poor *Alciphron*; which, upon ſuch a fair Repreſentation, would appear to *point* another Way than the Author intended, But, I believe, it is eaſy to find another Reaſon, of a more general Nature for all this ſtrange Conduct. Our Author plainly appears, as may be evident to any one who runs over his Book, to have been unacquainted with the real Strength of the Cauſe of Religion and Chriſtianity: For ſure, we are not to imagine he could have any Deſign to engage him of Purpoſe to conceal it, if he was really acquainted with it: For this Reaſon he either durſt not ventute all the

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View he had of the Strength of the Christian Cause, with the real Strength of its Adversaries, (or those who were call'd so to him,) as they themselves had represented it in some late Writings; or perhaps, thro' Laziness, car'd not to give himself the Trouble of Looking into those Writings in order to confute them: He therefore bethinks himself of an easier Way of Writing, and more adapted to the Taste of the *beau Monde*. He resolves to listen a while to Coffee-house Chat on both Sides of the Argument; and what he can pick up there on the Deists Side, as he imagines, he'll dress it up in the Shape in which it is easiest for him to expose and confute it: What he does not gather that Way, for his Purpose, he'll make up as he can: He'll give Names to the several Persons he has heard, or supposes he has heard declaiming in Coffee-houses on these profound Subjects: He'll cook up all into a Set of Dialogues, where, with a good deal of Nonsense and Ill-nature, he'll mingle a little Wit, some Sprinklings of sensible and genteel Conversation, and Abundance of amazing secret History: And to render the

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Conduct of the whole probable, and be a sufficient Apology for this Manner of combating Infidelity and defending Christianity: 'Tis but laying down for his first Principle, in the Beginning of his Book, That *the general Notions of Free-thinkers are better learned from their Conversation than from their Books* ‡; and why not, the general Principles of Christians better learned from *their Conversation* too, than from *their Bible*, or the Books written in Defence of it?

I leave it to you now, my Friend, to judge, upon second Thoughts, whether this Way of writing Dialogues is any Thing like D. *B*——*y*.

§ III. But, in the *second* Place, I am sure you know D. *B*——*y* to be well acquainted with the Ancients. One might have observed from the beautiful Dialogues he wrote long ago, (another Sort than this spurious Collection) that he was well acquainted then with *Plato*: And I am well informed, that his Acquaintance both with him and with the other Ancients has been going

‡ Alciphr. Vol. 1. Advert. and Pag. 4.

on and improving ſince. But, what Man, who had but *taſted* of theſe Fountains, could have been capable of attempting to paulm upon us ſuch an Account of *their* Sentiments concerning the το καλον, the *pulchrum* and *honeſtum*, the *moral Beauty*, as he has given us † from a ſingle detached Word or two of *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*? From which he would bear us in Hand, that there was no moral Beauty independent of the *actual* Eſteem and Applauſe (or the *Opinion*) of our Neighbours, or of Profit or Pleaſure; nay, that the very Notion of the *honeſtum*, according to them, was, what was *actually commended*, or was pleaſant and profitable, merely becauſe *Ariſtotle* ſays what is beautiful is ἐπαινετον, *laudable*: And *Plato* ſays, What is beautiful is pleaſant or profitable. This is ſuch an Account of the Sentiments of the Antients concerning the *honeſtum*, the moral Beauty, as many a clever School-boy who has never learned a Syllable of *Greek*, is capable of confuting out of his *Tully*, *Off. Lib.* 1. *Honeſtum*; *quod etiam ſi nobilitatum non ſit, tamen honeſtum ſit, quod-*

† Vol. I. p. 165,

quodque vere dicimus, etiamsi a nullo laudetur, laudabile esse natura. Et de Finib. Lib. 2. *Honestum id intelligimus, quod tale est, ut detracta omni utilitate, sine ullis premiis, fructibusque per seipsum possit jure laudari,* &c. But to proceed

§ IV. In the *third* Place, every Body knows that D. *B*——*y* is a Christian, and a Clergyman. Now, could any Christian, far less a Clergyman, bewray such an Unacquaintedness with what is to be said *for* Christianity, as well as *against* it, as this Author all along discovers? I will not pretend, that every understanding Christian is obliged to know what has in Fact been objected against Christianity, or any Part of it, by its Adversaries; tho' I think a Clergyman, especially one of eminent Rank is: But sure, he cannot be reckoned an understanding Christian, who is unacquainted with what is to be said for Christianity; nor can he be an honest Christian, who, in a pretended Defence of Christianity, will conceal what he knows of the Strength of the Cause, and substitute weak and frivolous Defences, in Place of those strong and solid ones that

have been already made by known Apologiſts; ſeeing this can ſerve no other Purpoſe than to ſwell the Triumphs of the moſt wretched of its Adverſaries, theſe who are ready to triumph upon a Victory which they themſelves know to be owing to the Weakneſs, not of the Cauſe, but of the Defender. Now, let any one look through the Book now under Conſideration, and but compare it with that ſhort and beautiful Defence of Chriſtianity, written long ago by the learned *Grotius*, which is in every Body's Hands; and it muſt be evident to him, that this Author muſt either be groſly ignorant of what is to be ſaid for Chriſtianity, or has purpoſely concealed what he knows of it; and thus has either ignorantly, or knaviſhly *betrayed* the Cauſe he undertook to *defend*.

But further, would any Chriſtian expoſe the Doctrines and Myſteries of our holy Religion, as he does, throughout his 7th Dialogue? What a ſtrange Account does he give us there of the Trinity, Grace, &c.? He plainly and directly explains away the Scripture Declarations about theſe Doctrines; makes the Words of Scripture concerning them to ſignify no Propoſitions

or

or Doctrines to be believed by us; but to have another and quite different Meaning or Intention, tho' delivered in ſuch Terms as are always uſed to convey a Doctrine, or lay down a Propoſition to be believed, and expreſly requiring an Aſſent to the Propoſitions ſo aſſerted: According to him, when the Scripture ſpeaks of the *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghoſt*, the only Meaning may be, to teach us to live *ſoberly*, *righteouſly and godly* *. It would be a needleſs Attempt to endeavour to lay open all our Author's Fallacies and Arts, to expoſe Chriſtianity upon this Head. "Words, "*ſays he* ‡, are not always intended to con-"vey Ideas, or ſignify Truths aſſerted; "but ſometimes only to excite Affecti-"ons." Perhaps ſo; but is this ever the Caſe of Words, in which a Propoſition is delivered; a Propoſition of which Belief is expreſly required? Can ſuch Words have any Meaning at all, if they convey no Ideas? Is not our Author's Way of explaining the Words of Scripture, making it indeed *a Noſe of Wax*?

But

* See particularly Vol. 2. p. 151, 152, 153.
‡ Alciphr. V 2. Pag. 143.

But the most plain and notorious Evidence that the Writer, *at least of some Part*, of this Book could not possibly be a Clergyman, or even a Christian; is that horrid and shocking Hint we have from his principal Character, and main Advocate for Religion and Christianity, *Euphranor*; which I shall set down in his own Words, (*Vol.* 1. *P.* 234, 235.) " *Alc.* " In Language the Signs are arbitrary; — " and consequently do not always suggest " real Matters of Fact. Whereas this na- " tural Language, or these visible Signs — " have the same constant regular Connec- " tion with Matters of Fact. — How " do you solve this Objection? *Euphr.* " You may solve it yourself, by the Help " of a Picture or Looking-glass;" *i. e. By the Help of a Picture or Looking-glass, you may see that this natural Language does not always suggest real Matters of Fact.* But I need not be at any Pains to draw our Author from behind that Vail of Modesty, with which he seeks decently to cover over so horrid an Insinuation: His Meaning is abundantly plain. The Language he is speaking of is, according to him, the Language of God. This Language, he

he ſays, does not always ſuggeſt real Matters of Fact. Now, he who, at any Time, uſes a Language which does not ſuggeſt real Matter of Fact, is either miſtaken himſelf, or knowingly impoſes upon others. I may leave any one to draw the Conſequence. I cannot, however, but make this Reflection upon the whole main Argument of that Dialogue. What Chriſtian Writer would ever have laid the chief Streſs of the Evidence of the *Being of a God*, the Foundation of all Religion, upon a meer Figure or Metaphor? For the Reſemblance or Analogy betwixt viſible Objects as Marks of tangible ones, and Language, amounts to no more. Our Author's whole Argument, very diffuſively and verboſely purſued, for the *Being of God*, comes to no more than this, " Viſible Objects and " tangible Objects are quite different; when " we narrowly conſider the Matter, there " appears no neceſſary Connection betwixt " them; yet, there is a conſtant Connec- " tion obſerved: (except in ſome Caſes, where 'tis as conſtantly otherwiſe) " Therefore God conſtantly ſpeaks to us, " not only where that Connection does " obtain, in which Caſe he ſpeaks Truth

" to

"to us; but also where it does not, in "which Case."——— I abhor to speak out the rest. 'Tis here, indeed, that our Author has used his strongest Art to blacken D. *B*——y, by making his *Euphranor* build upon a most ingenious Piece of his, which is subjoined to these Dialogues, his *New Theory of Vision*: But the ingenious Author of that Piece never pretended, that the curious Discoveries he there makes, are the main Proof of the *Being of a God:* On the contrary, the Proof he gives of this great Article, arising from his peculiar Principles, (in his *Dialogues between* Hylas *and* Philonous, and his *Treatise of the Principles of human Knowledge*) is of quite another Nature, and of another Sort of Strength: He has there clearly proved, that the whole Assemblage of sensible Objects is a constant Production, a new Creation every Moment. Let any Man of Sense compare what is contained in these excellent Books on this great Argument, with what is here produced by *Euphranor* upon that Subject; and I think I may venture the whole Question I am now upon on this Issue; whether he can imagine they both proceed from

from the ſame Author. D. *B*——*y* may, ſome where in theſe Pieces (which I have not now by me) have called the Connection betwixt viſible and tangible Objects *a Sort of Language of Nature:* But he knew very well, that to call it the *Language of God*, *ſuppoſes* the Being of God; and that this Connection was no otherwiſe a Proof of his Being, than as all other Parts of the Order of Nature are; and ſo no other Kind of Argument could be drawn from it to prove that great Principle, than the common one, *viz.* that a well-contrived Order proves a wiſe and good Cauſe. Nor is there any Thing in what D. *B*——*y* has delivered concerning this whole Argument to lead to that ſhocking Concluſion of *Euphranor*, which only ariſes from his puſhing the Matter too far. For, even allowing the Propriety of the Figure, and granting that God may be ſaid to *ſpeak to us by viſible Signs concerning tangible Objects*; ſeeing no more can be meant than that it is by Experience we learn the Connection betwixt viſible and tangible Objects, which is not a neceſſary Connection, but is arbitrary, as far as any Thing that flows from the perfect-

ly wiſe and good Pleaſure of the firſt Cauſe can be ſo: Certainly God cannot be ſaid to ſpeak to us *any other Thing* by this Language than what Experience ſhews us: Now the very ſame Train of Experience, from our earlieſt Days; which ſhews us, that ſuch and ſuch viſible Appearances are Indications of certain tangible Objects, in ſuch and ſuch Diſtances and Situations with Reſpect to our Bodies, ſhews us, that *in a Looking-glaſs* the Caſe is as conſtantly and uniformly otherwiſe. And to aſſert, that *God ſpeaks* to us every Deception of Sight, which ariſes merely from our Want of Attention and Experience, is as abſurd as to ſay, that he *ſpeaks* to us all the Miſtakes the Vulgar are apt to fall into with Reſpect to the Magnitudes, Figures, *&c.* of the heavenly Bodies: Nay, in the preſent Caſe, 'tis much more abſurd: For, ask the ſillieſt Clown, who is not a downright Ideot, and who underſtands your Words, whether the viſible Objects he ſees when he looks into a Looking-glaſs ſuggeſt to him any tangible Objects, Chairs or Tables *within the Glaſs?* and he'll readily tell you *no*, but they ſuggeſt to him ſuch Things *on the other Side of the*

Room

Room. Nor, indeed, was there any Thing in what our Author himſelf had delivered in the preceeding Part of this Dialogue, concerning the viſual Language, that could naturally lead him to that ſhocking and blaſphemous Inſinuation: 'Tis brought in to ſhow, that the *ſuggeſting of tangible Objects by viſible ones* agrees with *Language* in this Circumſtance, that in *Language the Signs are arbitrary*; *and conſequently* (*Alciphron* ſays, and *Euphranor* grants) *they do not always ſuggeſt real Matters of Fact:* But, that Words in Language do not always ſuggeſt real Matters of Fact, is no *neceſſary and unavoidable Conſequence* of their being *arbitrary* Signs, but flows from the Imperfection of thoſe who uſe them; was it not for this, Signs might be arbitrary, and yet be ſo uſed as *always* to ſuggeſt real Matters of Fact: What! tho' weak and fallible Creatures are liable to miſtake or lie, when they uſe arbitrary Signs, muſt the Caſe be the ſame with God, who *cannot lie*, and whoſe *Underſtanding is infinite*! Upon the whole, it may de referred to impartial Obſervers; whether a Zeal for the moſt important and fundamental Doctrines of Chriſtianity, nay

of all Religion, or a Fondneſs for his own *Noſtrums*, and a Forwardneſs to vent his own Dreams, appear to be uppermoſt with this Author?

§ V. The Importance of the Matter has obliged me to be ſomewhat large in the preceeding Section, but I ſhall be ſhorter in what remains.

Shall we *next* examine the Book before us, as the Peformance of a *Perſon of Candour!* I hope I need not be at any Pains to prove to you, that this is D. *B*——*y*'s Character: And ſure I need be at very little to demonſtrate, that the Author of this Medley now under Conſideration has no Pretence to the leaſt Share of it.

Would any fair and candid Adverſary of Infidels have back'd his weak Reaſonings in a Matter of Argument, with ſuch falſe and ſneaking Inſinuations as he makes;* that they are *Enemies to Government and Laws?* What can be the Meaning of this, but a low Art to call in the *ſecular Arm* to aſſiſt him, in defeating and ſilencing

* Vol. I. p. 43, 44, and elſewhere.

ſilencing effectually theſe formidable Antagoniſts? "Ah! Mr. Dean, this is a "*worn out Trick*; and, I'm afraid, won't "take at preſent." But 'tis very ſuitable to *Crito*'s ſtrange Aſſertion ‡: "The Chri-"ſtian reform'd Religion, is, I verily "think, the *only* Thing that makes us "deſerving of Freedom, or capable of "enjoying it." I have heard the Notion of *Sovereignty founded on Saint-ſhip*, juſtly redicul'd: But now, it ſeems, our Title to our natural and civil Liberties (for 'tis of ſuch he is ſpeaking) muſt be *founded on Orthodoxy*! I ſhall diſmiſs this Aſſertion without any further Remark, but that I heartily thank God that, for the Honour of *Chriſtianity*, they who are forward to lay on it the Blame of almoſt all the Miſchief that has happened in the World ſince the Days of *Tiberius*, can find no *ſuch* Foundation for this Imputation in the original Records of our holy and peaceable Religion. But, ſure, this Author, while he is in his hot Purſuit after thoſe Phantoms of Infidelity, his enflam'd Imagination had rais'd

‡ Vol. I. P. 344.

rais'd up before him, his *Moschon's*, *Gorgias's*, *Thrasenor's*, *Cimon's*, *Trypbon's*, *Demylus's*, and *Diagoras's*; and is crying out in his frantick Mood, *Precipice! Fire! Deluge! Earthquake! Thunder!* has all the while unluckily forgot the celebrated Mr. *Hobs*, the Head and Father, the Prophet and Apostle of all the *minute Philosophers in* England: Was not he a great *Friend to Government*, and even to absolute Power? the worthy Patron of the lovely Doctrines of *unlimited Obedience and Nonresistance*; and one who acted in the Spirit of *Massacre* against the *Greek* and *Latin* Authors, for instilling into us from our Childhood the Notions of *Liberty*!

But, a most memorable Instance of the Candour of this Author, is the Character he gives of the *late Earl of* Shaftsbury, under the Name of *Cratylus*.* "*Cratylus*, a Man prejudiced a-
" gainst the Christian Religion, of a crazy
" Constitution, of a Rank above most
" Men's Ambition, and a Fortune equal to
" his Rank, had little Capacity for sensual
" Vices, or Temptation to dishonest Ones.
" *Cra-*

* Vol. I. P. 190.

" *Cratylus* having talked himſelf, or ima-
" gined that he had talked himſelf into a
" ſtoical Enthuſiaſm about the Beauty of
" Virtue, did, under the Pretence of mak-
" ing Men heroically virtuous, endeavour
" to deſtroy the Means of making them
" reaſonably and humanely ſo."

Who can ſtand before Envy? ſays the wiſe Man. I'm ſure one may defy the moſt ſpotleſs and untainted Character that ever was, to ſtand ſuch an invidious Cenſure and Scrutiny as this. The very odious Inſinuation itſelf allows, that the Character of the Man was unſpotted, free from ſenſual or diſhoneſt Vices: But all this, it ſeems, muſt go for nothing, if there is Room left to alledge, that he had *little Capacity* for the *one* and *little Temptation* to the *other*; (and who but an All-ſeeing God can judge of that?) But, if this can be but plauſibly inſinuated, the Concluſion may be, that his Virtue was cheap and eaſy, it can ſcarce be reckon'd any *Virtue* at all. To make it appear how much ſuch a Way of judging may ſerve to depreciate the Virtue of the beſt Men that ever lived, let but thoſe who are of baſe enough Spirits to do it, make the Trial upon the

the moſt unexceptionable Characters, and ſee what the Conſequence will be.

That the great Man, who is abuſed in this ſneaking Manner, was *prejudiced againſt the Chriſtian Religion*, is a mere unſupported Aſſertion, and as eaſily denied as aſſerted; and that is enough to ſay of it at preſent: But let this Author, if he has any Honour or Conſcience, produce his Inſtances to prove it; and I dare promiſe him there may be found Hands that ſhall be ready to take him up upon that Head: But let his Inſtances be fairly given, in the Author's own Words, or pointing at the Places of his Works; and not delivered in the general and confuſed Way of Miſrepreſentation, by which he has hitherto endeavoured to blacken him.

As to the other Parts of the Character: Any honeſt and candid Mind may well be amazed at them. Was it not enough, that an All-ruling *Providence*, for Reaſons known to infinite Wiſdom, afflicted this great and good Man with *a crazy Conſtitution*, by which he was cut off almoſt in the Beginning of his Years; but this very Affliction of Providence, ſhall, by a pretended Defender of the Religion of Love and Charity, be made a Handle for reproaching

ing him and depreciating his Virtue! Does not this Author know, that Appetites and Temptations to ſenſual Vices may be very ſtrong, when Capacity for them is very little? And how many Inſtances have we, that the higheſt Rank and Fortune is not ſufficient to exempt Men from Temptations to diſhoneſt Vices, when their Virtue has not conquer'd or cur'd the Inclination to them?

For what follows: Let any unbyaſſed Perſon read my Lord *Shaftsbury's Inquiry concerning Virtue*: And then judge, whether he has *talk'd, or imagin'd he had talked himſelf into a ſtoical Enthuſiaſm*, &c. or *endeavoured to deſtroy the Means of making* Men *reaſonably and humanely* virtuous; or whether, on the contrary, any uninſpired Writer has done more to *draw* People to Virtue *with the Cords of a Man* than he has done, or has more clearly and fully illuſtrated this Principle, "That Virtue, con-"ſidered in all Lights, is every Man's "true Intereſt," which *Euphranor* intimates to be the ſtrongeſt Motive to it.*

* Alciphr. Vol. I. p. 168.

Or, let those who have never perused his Works, and don't yet find themselves at Leisure, or in a Disposition to sit down to that admirable *Inquiry*, but read carefully over that short Sketch from him, contained in the Performance of a waggish Friend of mine, I send you herewith‡; and from that Specimen, fairly drawn out of his Writings, let every candid Person make a Judgment of the Character and Writings of the Man whom this Author abuses in so vile and unworthy a Manner; whether he was *prejudiced against the Christian Religion*, or *derided a future Judgment*;† or whether such base Reproaches of him could be *suggested* by any one but a false Christian, one who believes in a God who *suggests* to him what is *not real Matter of Fact*, every Time he looks into a Looking-glass.*

§ VI. After what has been said; need we spend Time in examining the Book before us as the Performance of a Man of Sense, or, at least, of some Regard to his own Reputation. These Characters, sure, will

‡ See below Pred. Shafts. §. 2.— † Theory of Vision vindicat. P. 5. * Vid. Ter. Eun. Ac. 3. S. 5. l. 36.—

will be allowed to D. *B*——*y* by his greateſt Enemies, and thoſe who have the moſt indifferent Opinion of his Sentiments in Philoſophy. Let me lay before you an Inſtance or two, what Portion of theſe Qualifications we may reckon this Author poſſeſt of.

You know very well what Uſe the Ancients made of ſuch Notions as theſe, " That it is not the *Things* which befall " us that diſturb us, but our *Opinions* about " them; that on *Opinion* our Happineſs " depends; that our *Opinion* of Good is the " leading Principle of our Lives; in a " Word, that *Opinion* is all in all; or, as " the *Engliſh* Poet expreſſes it,

Opinion *is the Rate of Things,*
From thence our Peace doth flow,
I have a better Fate than Kings,
Becauſe I think it ſo.

To expreſs this Sentiment, *M. Antonine*, who, I hope, was no minute Philoſopher, uſes the Phraſe πιστις ὑπολημψις, a Phraſe which occurs frequently in his excellent

Book*, particularly in a Passage quoted from him by my Lord *Shaftsbury*;‖ who accordingly, makes it the *Motto* of one of his beautiful and significant little *Pictures*, (the *Mirror*) expressly referring there to the Place where he quotes at Length the Passage of *M. Antonine*, whence he took it. Now, who, but a blundering Wretch, would have carried the Odium to my Lord *Shaftsbury* so far, as to endeavour to expose this Sentiment by adducing the Phrase ΠΑΝΤΑ ΥΠΟΛΗΨΙΣ as the Expression of the Character of a down-
" right Sceptick, the Sum and Substance,
" the grand *Arcanum*, and ultimate Con-
" clusion of the Sect of *minute Philoso-*
" *phers*?‡ 'Tis obvious what Use my Lord *Shaftsbury* always makes of that Sentiment;† and that it could be no more his Design than *M. Antonine*'s to mean by it, that there was no Certainty in any Thing, seeing it is the profess'd and declar'd Design of his *Inquiry*, to shew, that the Principles of Virtue may be established with the

* Vid. L. 2. § 15. L. 3, § 9. L. 12. § 22. & ib. Not. Gataker & Dacerii. ‖ Char. Vol. 3. p. 199. ‡ Alciphr. Vol. 2, p. 193. † See Char. Vol. 2. p. 435, 437. and Vol. 3. p, 186, 196,—199.

the highest Certainty;* a Design, which, in that Piece, he has executed in an incomparable Manner.

Again, My Lord *Shaftsbury*, speaking of the *present Italian Authors*, says,† "They "may be reckoned no better than the "Corrupters of true Learning and Eru-"dition." Now, would any one, but a downright Numscull, oppose to this Censure, that *Bembus* and *Sadoletus*, *Jovius* and *Vida*, were *Italians*†? Why might he not as well have told us, "That *Virgil* and "*Horace*, *Tully* and *Livy*, were *Italians*.

Would you have one Specimen, amongst many, of this Author's Regard to his own Character and Reputation? Look into *Vol.* 1. *Page* 292, where you'll find, "the most unjust Usage of *Lucius Tar-*"*quinius Collatinus*," mentioned from the Observation of a learned *Father*, as "an In-"stance of Iniquity agreed to by the pub-"lick Body of the *Romans*," and such an Instance of Iniquity, as "the boldest of our "minute Philosophers would hardly un-"dertake in a popular Assembly, to pro-"pose

* See Char. Vol. II. p. 173, 174. † Char. Vol. I. p. 335. † Alc. Vol. I. p. 321, 322.

" pose any Thing parallel to it." Who this same worthy Father was, or whether this Author can make *Fathers* as well as *Freethinkers*; I neither know nor am concerned: The Fathers, we know from *Barbeyrac's* Introduction to *Puffendorff*, were generally wonderful Moralists! But sure there must have been little Sense, or very little Honesty and publick Virtue, either in the *Father* who could make such an Observation, or in the *Son* who could adopt it. What was this same *monstrous Instance of Iniquity*; this *most unjust Usage?* Why†: " After the Expulsion of *Tarquinius Superbus*, this *L. Tarquinius Collatinus*, a very " weak Man, and a near Relation of the " Tyrant, was, upon no other Merit than " his having been the Husband of the " abus'd *Lucretia*, chosen Consul, together " with *L. Junius Brutus*. Sometime after a Demand was made by some neighbouring Powers for delivering up the " Effects of the *Tarquins*: The Motion " was opposed by *Brutus*; as these Goods " were an inconsiderable enough Forfeit; " for

† Vid. Liv. L. 2. D. Halic. L. 5. & Plut. in Poplic.

" for the great Injuries they had done
" the State, and the restoring of them was
" putting the Sinews of War into their
" Hands, to enable them to re-enslave
" their Country: The Proposal, however,
" was by the *Influence of his Collegue* com-
" ply'd with; and it proved as *Brutus*
" judged: For the very Ambassadors sent
" to make this Demand were, under the
" Covert of their Embassy, promoting a
" Conspiracy of some licentious Youths of
" *Rome*; to betray their Country, mur-
" der the Consuls, and bring back the
" Tyrant. The *Aquilii*, Nephews of *Col-*
" *latinus*, were at the Head of the Con-
" spiracy: And *Brutus*'s two Sons were
" drawn into it. The Conspiracy was
" discovered by a Servant of the *Aquilii*:
" And, when the noble *Brutus* had, with
" an unparalleled Firmness of Mind, with-
" stood the Shocks of *paternal Affection*
" contending against his *publick Virtue*, and
" beheld unmov'd the just Execution of
" his two Sons; his weak Collegue had
" the Assurance to beg the Lives of his Ne-
" phews, the Heads of the Conspiracy; and,
" this being refus'd to his Request, he then
" had the Wickedness to interpose his Au-

" thority

" thority as Consul, and command their
" Liberation: And at the same Time
" (according to *Plutarch*) would have been
" at delivering up to *them* the *Servant* who
" had discovered the Conspiracy. After
" all this Discovery of the Abilities of
" this Consul; after this Specimen of pu-
" blick Justice and Love of his Country,
" in a Man of whom other Things might
" have been expected, even on Account
" of his private Wrongs; what do *the pu-*
" *blick Body of the* Romans? Why, they
" earnestly entreat him to lay down his
" Office and leave them; for, after what had
" past, they could not reckon themselves
" safe while he was among them: This
" Motion being seconded by the Entreaties
" of his Father in Law, he complies with
" it: And, being not only allowed to carry
" off all his Effects, but also receiving an
" additional Bounty, of twenty Talents out
" of the Treasury, and five more out of
" *Brutus*'s Pocket; he is permitted peace-
" ably to remove to *Lavinium*; where he
" liv'd in quiet, and died in a good old
" Age." A rare Piece of publick Con-
duct, truly! to be branded with the Names
of *unparallel'd Iniquity, and most unjust U-*

sage;

ſage; by one who, at the ſame Time, has the Impudence to reproach his Antagoniſts as Enemies to Government and Laws, and Favourers of Inſurrections!

CONCLUSION.

By this Time, my Friend, I ſuppoſe I have more than ſufficiently convinced you, that Dr. *B*——*y* cannot poſſibly be the Author of this ſame *Alciphron*; that you had need hereafter to be more upon your Guard againſt giving heed to Rumour; and that you have no Occaſion to alter your Thoughts of your once beloved Author, on Account of this paultry Performance.

You'll tell me, perhaps, that you wonder the Doctor has not publickly diſclaim'd the Book. But, pray, has he ever own'd it? And can you, in good Earneſt, think that an Author of a Character well eſtabliſh'd, by Writings he has formerly publiſh'd with his Name at them, is oblig'd after that publickly to diſclaim any wretched Performance common Fame ſhall be ſo impertinent as to aſcribe to him? Eſpecially when there are, in the Performance itſelf, ſuch

internal Marks as, to any who can diſtinguiſh between *Tinſel* and *Sterling*, may make it evident almoſt to a Demonſtration, that the Book could not poſſibly have been written by a Perſon of his *known* Talents, Learning, Integrity, Piety, Candor, and good Senſe.

You'll ask me, it may be, who, or what Sort of Perſon, I think was the Author of this Book then? To which I anſwer, That, amidſt a Heap of vile and ſilly Things contain'd in it, there are here and there ſuch excellent Things, and ſo beautifully hit off, that I cannot conceive of the whole Book as the Production of one and the ſame Hand: And to me it has much more of the Appearance of an Entertainment clubb'd for us, by ſeveral Hands, of very different Characters and Capacities. And when I conſider, that the moſt ſilly and ſtupid Things in it, are deliver'd upon the Points that moſt directly belong to the Defence of Religion and Chriſtianity; and that the beſt and brighteſt Things occur upon other Subjects, occaſionally touch'd at; and withal, how groſly, in ſome Inſtances, the Cauſe of Chriſtianity

is

is betray'd and expos'd; I muſt be perſuaded, that the prevailing Party in this Club have been far from being Friends to the Chriſtian Cauſe. I am,

My dear Friend,

Near *Inverneſs*,
Aug. 1. 1732.

Yours heartily.



The PREDICTIONS of the late Earl of SHAFTSBURY, concerning Alciphron, &c.

INTRODUCTION.

AMONG all the other extraordinary Things about the late Earl of *Shaftsbury* which I have obſerved you, *Philalethes*, to be well acquainted with; there is one, which, you ſeem to me to have been hitherto a Stranger to, which I wonder how it has eſcaped you; I mean his Gift of Prophecy, of which, I think, I have obſerved ſeveral Inſtances in many memorable Events which have happened ſince his Death, of which I find pretty plain Predictions in thoſe Writings he had finiſhed and publiſhed in his Lifetime.

I have, in particular, taken Notice of ſeveral Things that have occurred in the Republick of Letters, and amongſt Writers, of which he ſpeaks in ſeveral Places of his Works, in the Stile, indeed, of one talking of Things already paſt; a

Circum-

Circumſtance common to all Prophets, tho' that ſeems to have hindered your adverting to the Prophecy; but of which ſuch far more memorable and illuſtrious Inſtances have come to paſs ſince he wrote, than were to be obſerved before; as plainly ſhew that ſeveral of his Words, in their full Extent and Meaning, muſt be underſtood rather as Predictions concerning the former, than Narratives of the latter.

And, becauſe you ſeem'd ſurprized when laſt Time we were talking of him, I ſpoke of him as a Prophet; I ſhall now lay before you ſome Inſtances of this, with regard to a late noted Book, ſaid to be written by a celebrated Clergyman; *viz. Alciphron*, or *the Minute-Philoſopher*.

§ I. If you have carefully peruſed that Book, and adverted to the Manner of writing Dialogue uſed throughout the whole of it; the Gaiety of Stile, the high Banter and ſcurrilous Jocks, the booty Way of writing ſo regularly carried on through ſuch a long Train of Dialogues, that nothing written before my Lord *Shaftsbury*'s Time was comparable to it: Can you then look on that Paſſage (*Characteriſticks* Vol. 3. *p.* 291.

p. 291.—296) in any other View, than as a Prophecy concerning this Book?

'Joy to the *reverend* Authors who can 'afford to be thus gay, and condeſcend 'to correct us in this *Lay*-Wit. The Ad-'vances they make in Behalf of Piety and 'Manners, by ſuch a *popular* Stile, are 'doubtleſs found, upon Experience, to be 'very conſiderable. As theſe Reformers 'are nicely qualified to hit the Air of 'Breeding and Gentility, *they will, in Time, 'no Doubt*, refine their Manner, and im-'prove this jocular Method, to the Edi-'fication of the polite World, who have 'been ſo long ſeduc'd by the Way of Rail-'lery and Wit. They may do Wonders 'by their *comick* MUSE, and may thus, per-'haps, find Means to *laugh* Gentlemen in-'to their Religion, who have unfortu-'nately been laugh'd out of it. For what 'Reaſon is there to ſuppoſe that Ortho-'doxy ſhould not be able to laugh as a-'greeably, and with as much Refined-'neſs as Hereſy or Infidelity?

'At preſent, it muſt be own'd, the '*Characters* or *Perſonages* employ'd by our 'new orthodox Dialogiſts, carry with 'them little Proportion or Coherence; and

'in

‘ in this respect may be said to suit per-
‘ fectly with that figurative metaphorical
‘ Stile and rhetorical Manner, in which
‘ their Logick and Arguments are gene-
‘ rally couch'd. Nothing can be more
‘ complex or multiform than their moral
‘ *Draughts* or *Sketches* of Humanity. These
‘ indeed are so far from representing any
‘ *particular* MAN, or *Order of* MEN, that
‘ they scarce resemble any Thing of the
‘ *Kind.* 'Tis by their Names only that
‘ these *Characters* are figur'd. Tho' they
‘ bear different Titles, and are set up to
‘ maintain contrary Points, they are found,
‘ at the Bottom, to be all of the same
‘ Side, and, notwithstanding their seem-
‘ ing Variance, to co-operate in the most
‘ officious Manner with the Author,
‘ towards the Display of his own
‘ proper Wit, and the Establishment of
‘ his private Opinion and Maxims. They
‘ are indeed his very legitimate and ob-
‘ sequious *Puppets*, as like *real Men* in
‘ Voice, Action and Manners, as those
‘ wooden or wire Engines of the lower
‘ Stage. *Philotheus* and *Philatheus*, *Phi-*
‘ *lautus* and *Philalethes*, (*i. e. Euphranor* and
‘ *Alciphron*, *Crito* and *Lysicles*) are of one

‘ and

'and the ſame Order: Juſt Tallies to one 'another: Queſtioning and anſwering in 'Concert, and with ſuch a Sort of Alter- 'native as is known in a vulgar Play, 'where *one* Perſon lies down blindfold, 'and preſents himſelf as fair as may be, to '*another*, who by Favour of the Compa- 'ny, or the Aſſiſtance of his good Fortune, 'deals his Companion many a ſound Blow, 'without being once challeng'd or brought 'into his Turn of *lying down*.

'There is the ſame curious Mixture of '*Chance*, and *elegant Viciſſitude*, in the Stile 'of theſe Mock-perſonages of our new *The- 'ological Drama*; with this Difference on- 'ly,' "That after the poor Phantom or "Shadow of an Adverſary has ſaid as little "for his Cauſe as can be imagin'd, and "given as many Opens and Advantages "as could be deſired, he *lies down* for "good and all, and paſſively ſubmits to "the killing Strokes of his unmerciful "Conqueror.

'Were I to adviſe theſe Authors, to- 'wards whom I am extremely well-affec- 'ted on Account of their good-humour'd 'Zeal, and the ſeeming Sociableneſs of 'their Religion; I ſhould ſay to 'em,'

" Gentlemen! Be not ſo cautious of furniſh-
" ing your *Repreſentative* SCEPTICK with
" too good *Arguments*, or too ſhrewd a Turn
" of *Wit* or *Humour*. Be not ſo fearful of
" giving Quarter. Allow your Adverſary
" his full Reaſon, his Ingenuity, Senſe,
" and Art. Truſt to the *chief Character*
" or HERO *of your Piece*. Make him as
" dazling *bright* as you are able. He will
" undoubtedly overcome the utmoſt Force
" of his Opponent, and diſpel the Dark-
" neſs or Cloud, which the Adverſary may
" unluckily have raiſed. But if, when
" you have fairly wrought up your *Anta-*
" *goniſt* to his due Strength and cogniz-
" able Proportion, your *chief Character* can-
" not afterwards prove a Match for him,
" or ſhine with a ſuperior Brightneſs;
" Whoſe Fault is it? The *Subject's?* ——
" This, I hope, you will never allow.
" Whoſe, therefore, beſide *your own?*——
" Beware then; and conſider well your
" Strength and Maſterſhip in this Manner
" of Writing, and in the qualifying Prac-
" tice of the polite World, e'er you at-
" tempt theſe accurate and refin'd Lim-
" nings or Portraitures of Mankind, or
" offer to bring *Gentlemen* on the Stage.

" For

" For if *real Gentlemen* ſeduc'd, as you pre-
" tend, and made erroneous in their Re-
" ligion or Philoſophy, diſcover not the
" leaſt Feature of their real Faces in your
" Looking-glaſs, nor know themſelves, in
" the leaſt, by your Deſcription; they will
" hardly be apt to think they are refuted.
" How wittily ſoever your Comedy may
" be wrought up, they will ſcarce appre-
" hend any of that Wit to fall upon them-
" ſelves. They may laugh indeed at the
" Diverſion you are pleaſed to give them:
" But *the Laugh* perhaps may be different
" from what you intend. They may ſmile
" ſecretly to ſee themſelves thus encoun-
" ter'd; when they find, at laſt, your Au-
" thority laid by, and your *ſcholaſtick* Wea-
" pons quitted, in Favour of this weak
" Attempt, *To maſter them by their own*
" *Arms, and proper Ability.*"

§ II. Again, compare the ſmart Strokes of Raillery this Author is full of, againſt the Free-thinkers; with the *ſerious* Pains he takes, in ſome Places, † to arraign them

 as

† *Alciphr.* V. 1. p. 43, 44, 89, 131, 132. & 347. 1, 2, 3.

as Enemies to Government and dangerous to the State, and to expose them to the Lash of civil Laws and the Punishments of the secular Arm, and see how patly this is also foretold, *Character*. Vol. 1. *p*. 65, 66, 67.

'The tragical Gentlemen, with the grim 'Aspect and Mein of true *Inquisitors*, have 'but an ill Grace when they vouchsafe to 'quit their Austerity, and be jocose and 'pleasant with an Adversary, whom they 'would chuse to treat in a very different 'Manner.——There is nothing so ridicu- 'lous as this *JANUS*-Face of Writers, who 'with one Countenance force a Smile, and 'with another show nothing beside Rage 'and Fury. Having enter'd the Lists, and 'agreed to the fair Laws of Combat by 'Wit and Argument, *they have no sooner* '*prov'd their Weapon*, than you hear 'em 'crying aloud for Help, and delivering 'over to the *secular Arm*.'

'There can't be a more preposterous 'Sight than *an Executioner* and *a Merry-* '*Andrew* acting their Part upon the same 'Stage: Yet, I am perswaded, any one 'will find this to be the real Picture of cer- 'tain modern Zealots in their controversial 'Writings. They are no more Masters of

'Gravity,

' Gravity, than they are of good Humour. ' The first always runs into harsh Severity, ' and the latter into an aukward Buffoonry. ' And thus between Anger and Pleasure, ' Zeal and Drollery, their Writing has ' much such a Grace as the Play of hu- ' morsome Children, who, at the same ' Instant, are both peevish and wanton, ' and can laugh and cry almost in one and ' the same Breath.

' How agreeable such Writings are like ' to prove, and of what Effect towards ' the winning over, or convincing those ' who are supposed to be in Error, I need ' not go about to explain. ——*Pedantry* and ' *Bigotry* are Mill-stones able to sink the ' best Book, which carries the least Part of ' their dead Weight.——If a Philosopher ' speaks, Men hear him willingly, while ' he keeps to his Philosophy. So is a Chri- ' stian heard, while he keeps to his profes- ' sed Charity and Meekness. In a Gentle- ' man we allow of Pleasantry and Rail- ' lery, as being manag'd always with good ' Breeding, and never gross or clownish. ' But if a mere Scholastick, intrenching ' upon all these Characters, and writing as ' it were *by Starts and Rebounds from one*

' *of*

'*of these to another*, appears upon the whole
'as little able to keep the Temper of Chri-
'stianity, as to use the Reason of a Philo-
'sopher, or the Raillery of a Man of Breed-
'ing; What Wonder is it, if the mon-
'strous Product of such a jumbled Brain
'be ridiculous to the World?'

If you imagine this Prophecy any Thing strain'd in the Application; pray look over the Book again, and then pronounce.

§ 3. Next, Look into this Author's Way of representing and exposing my Lord *Shaftsbury*'s Notions concerning Virtue and future Rewards: And judge whether the Defence and Apology *Theocles* is introduced as making in the *Rhapsody*, (*V.* 2. *page* 264——279) for the Author of the *Inquiry*, was not expressly and prophetically written against *that Dialogue*; being evidently more directly calculated to obviate the Misrepresentations made by the Author's Puppets there, than any Thing suppos'd to be objected by *Philocles*; which Supposition may be reckon'd to be made prophetically too. Give me Leave to set down only these Parts of that long and excellent Discourse, that seem strongest

and

and clearest to this Purpose; and which I may venture to entitle,

The late Earl of Shaftbury's *Answer to the third Dialogue of* Alciphron.

' Our Author * (says *Theocles*) having ' this one chief Aim; " How, in the *first* " Place, to reconcile these Persons (who " are loose in the very Grounds and Prin- " ciples of all Religion) to *the Principles* " *of Virtue*; that, by this Means a Way " might be laid open to *Religion*; by re- " moving those greatest, if not only Ob- " stacles to it, which arise from the Vi- " ces and Passions of Men:" Upon this ' Account, endeavours chiefly to establish ' *Virtue* on Principles, by which he is able ' to argue with those who are not as yet ' induc'd to own a God, or *future State*. ' If he cannot do this much, he reckons ' he does nothing. For (*N. B.*) how ' can *supreme Goodness* be intelligible to ' those who know not what *Goodness itself* ' is?

* *Viz.* the Author of the *Inquiry concerning Virtue.*

" is? Or how can Virtue be underſtood to
" deſerve Reward, when as yet its Merit
" and Excellence is unknown?

" Our Friend endeavours to ſhow, " that
" Virtue is really ſomething *in itſelf*, and
" in the Nature of Things: Not arbitra-
" ry, or dependent on *Cuſtom*, *Fancy*, or
" *Will*; not even on the *ſupreme Will* it-
" ſelf, which, being *neceſſarily good*, is go-
" vern'd by it, and ever uniform with it."

" And notwithſtanding he has thus made
" VIRTUE his chief Subject, and *in ſome*
" *Meaſure* independent on Religion, yet
" I fancy he may poſſibly appear at laſt as
" high a *Divine* as he is a *Moraliſt*.

" I will venture to aſſert " that who-
" ever ſincerely defends VIRTUE, and is a
" *Realiſt* in MORALITY, muſt of Neceſ-
" ſity, in a Manner, by the *ſame* Scheme of
" Reaſoning, prove as very a *Realiſt* in
" DIVINITY."

" REVELATION is founded on the Ac-
" knowledgment of a divine Exiſtence:
" And 'tis the Province of Philoſophy alone
" to *prove* what Revelation only *ſuppoſes*. I
" look on it therefore, as a moſt unfair
" Way, for thoſe who wou'd be *Builders*,
" and undertake this *proving* Part, to lay
ſuch

' ſuch a Foundation as is unſufficient to
' bear the Structure. Nothing can be more
' unbecoming than to talk magiſterially
' and in venerable Terms of " a *ſupreme*
" Nature, an *infinite Being*, and a Deity ;"
' when all the while *a Providence* is never
' meant, nor any Thing like *Order* or *the*
' *Government of a Mind* admitted. For when
' *theſe* are underſtood, and *real Divinity*
' acknowledg'd ; the Notion is not dry,
' and barren ; but ſuch Conſequences are
' neceſſarily drawn from it, as muſt ſet us
' in Action, and find Employment for our
' ſtrongeſt Affections. All the *Duties* of
' RELIGION evidently follow hence ; and
' no Exception remains againſt any of thoſe
' great Maxims which *Revelation* has eſta-
' bliſh'd.

' Now I dare preſume you will take it
' as a ſubſtantial Proof of my Friend's be-
' ing far enough from Irreligion, if it be
' ſhewn that he has eſpous'd that Notion of
' *divine* Love ; ſuch as ſeparates from eve-
' ry Thing worldly, ſenſual, or meanly in-
' tereſted: A Love which is *pure* and *un-*
' *mix'd*; which has no other Object than
' merely *the Excellency of that Being itſelf*,

' nor admits of any other Thought of Hap-
' pineſs, than in *its ſingle Fruition.*

' For tho' it be natural enough (he
' wou'd tell you) for a mere political
' Writer to ground his great Argument
' for Religion on the Neceſſity of ſuch a
' Belief as that *of a future Reward and*
' *Puniſhment*; yet, if you will take his O-
' pinion, 'tis a very ill Token of Sinceri-
' ty in Religion, and in the Chriſtian Re-
' ligion more eſpecially, to reduce it to ſuch
' a Philoſophy as will allow no Room to
' that other Principle of *Love*; but treats all
' of that Kind as *Enthuſiaſm*, for ſo much as
' *aiming* at what is called *Diſintereſtedneſs*,
' or teaching the *Love of God or Virtue* for
' God or Virtue's Sake. For how ſhall
' one deny, that to ſerve God by Compul-
' ſion, or for Intereſt merely, is *ſervile*
' and *mercenary?* Is it not evident, that
' the only *true* and *liberal* Service paid ei-
' ther to that ſupreme Being, or to any
' other Superior, is *that* "which proceeds
" from an *Eſteem* or *Love* of the Perſon
" ſerv'd; *a Senſe* of Duty or Gratitude, and
" a Love of the dutiful and grateful Part,
" as *good* and *amiable, in itſelf?*" And
' where is the Injury to *Religion*, from ſuch

' a Con-

' a Concession as this? Or what Detraction is it from the Belief of an After-reward or Punishment, to own "that the "Service caused by it, is not equal to "that which is *voluntary* and *with Inclination*, but is rather disingenuous and of "the slavish Kind?" Is it not still for the 'Good of Mankind and of the World, that 'Obedience to the Rule of Right should 'some Way or other be paid; if not *in* '*the better Way*, yet at least *in this imperfect one?* And is it not to be shewn, "that altho' this Service of *Fear* be allow'd ever so low or base: Yet RELIGION still being *a Discipline* and *Progress* of "the Soul towards Perfection, the Motive "of Reward and Punishment is primary "and of the highest Moment with us; "till being capable of more sublime Instruction, we are led from this *servile* "State, to the generous Service of *Affection* and *Love?*

'To this it is that in our Friend's Opinion we ought all of us to aspire, so as 'to endeavour, "That the *Excellence of* "*the Object*, not the *Reward* or *Punishment*, "should be our Motive: But that where "thro' the Corruption of our Nature, the

" *former* of these Motives is found insuf-
" ficient to excite to Virtue, there the *lat-*
" *ter* should be brought in Aid, and *on no*
" *Account be undervalued* or *neglected.*"

'Now, if there be in Nature such a Ser-
'vice as that of Affection and Love, there
'remains then only to consider of *the Ob-*
'*ject*, whether there be really that *supreme*
'*One* we suppose. For if there be in Na-
'ture a *supreme Mind* or DEITY; we have
'then an Object consummate, and com-
'prehensive of all which is *good* and *excel-*
'*lent*. And this Object, of all others, must
'of Necessity be the most amiable, the most
'engaging, and of highest Satisfaction and
'Enjoyment. Now, that there is such a
'principal Object as this in the World,
'the World alone by its wise and perfect
'Order must evince. This Order, if in-
'deed perfect, excludes all *real* Ill. And
'that it really does so, is what our Author
'so earnestly maintains, by solving the best
'he can those untoward *Phænomena* and ill
'Signs, taken from the Course of Provi-
'dence, in the seemingly unequal Lot of
'*Virtue* in this World.

'Tis true; tho' the Appearances hold
'ever so strongly against *Virtue*, and in fa-

'vour

vour of Vice, the Objection which arises hence against a DEITY may be easily removed, and all set right again on the Supposal of a *future State*. This to a Christian, or One already convinc'd of so great a Point, is sufficient to clear every dark Cloud of Providence. But the Case is otherwise as to the People we are here to encounter. They are at a Loss for Providence, and seek to find it in the World. The Aggravation of the appearing Disorders in worldly Affairs, and the blackest Representation of Society and human Nature, will hardly help 'em to this View. But being once convinc'd of Order, and a Providence as to Things *present*, they may soon, perhaps, be satisfied even of a *future State*. For if Virtue be to itself *no small Reward*, and Vice *in a great Measure* its own Punishment; we have a *solid Ground* to go upon. The plain Foundations of a distributive Justice, and due Order in this World, may lead us to conceive a *further Building*. We apprehend a larger Scheme, and easily resolve ourselves why Things were not *compleated* in this State; but their *Accomplishment* reserv'd rather to some further Period. For

had

'had the Good and Virtuous of Mankind 'been *wholly prosperous* in this Life; had 'Goodness never met with Opposition, nor 'Merit ever lain under a Cloud; Where 'had been the *Trial*, Victory, or Crown of '*Virtue?* Where had the Virtues had their 'Theatre, or whence their Names? Where 'had been *Temperance* or *Self-denial?* Where '*Patience*, *Meekness*, *Magnanimity?* What '*Virtue* without a Conflict, and the Encoun'ter of such Enemies as arise both within, 'and from abroad?

'But as many as are the Difficulties 'which *Virtue* has to encounter in this 'World, her Force is yet superior. *Exposed* 'as she is here, she is not however *aban'don'd* or left miserable. Her present Por'tion is sufficient to shew Providence al'ready engag'd on her Side. And since 'there is such Provision for her *here*, such 'Happiness, and such Advantages even in 'this Life; How probable must it appear, 'that this providential Care is extended 'yet further to a *succeeding Life*, and per'fected *hereafter?*

'This is what, *in our Friend's Opinion*, 'may be said in Behalf of a future State, 'to those who question Revelation. 'Tis

'this

this must render Revelation probable, and secure that *first* Step to it, the Belief of a Deity and Providence. A Providence must be prov'd from what we see of Order in Things present. *All* must not be referred to *a Hereafter*. For a disorder'd State, in which *all* present Care of Things is given up, Vice uncontroul'd and Virtue neglected, represents a very *Chaos*, and reduces us to the believ'd Atoms, Chance, and Confusion of the Atheists.

What therefore can be worse done in the Cause of a *Deity*, than to *magnify* Disorder, and *exaggerate* the Misfortunes of Virtue, so far as to render it an *unhappy Choice* with respect to this World? To declaim in this Manner against *Virtue* to those of a looser Faith, will make 'em the less believe a *Deity*, but not the more a *future State*. Nor can it be thought sincerely that any Man, by having the most elevated Opinion of Virtue, and of the Happiness it creates, was ever the less inclin'd to the Belief of a future State. On the contrary, it will ever be found, that as they who are Favourers of Vice are always the least

wil-

‘ willing to hear of a future Existence; ‘ so they who are in Love with Virtue, ‘ are the readiest to embrace that Opinion ‘ which renders it so illustrious, and makes ‘ its Cause triumphant.

‘ How is it possible then, that *an Author* ‘ should, for exalting *Virtue* merely, be ‘ *deem'd an Enemy to a future State?* How ‘ can our Friend be judg'd false to *Religion*, ‘ for defending a Principle on which the ‘ very Notion of GOD and *Goodness* depends? ‘ For this he says only, and this is the ‘ Sum of all: “ That by building a future “ State *on the Ruins* of *Virtue*, RELIGI- “ ON in general, and the Cause of a “ *Deity* is betray'd; and by making Re- “ wards and Punishments the principal “ Motives to Duty, the Christian Religi- “ on in particular is overthrown, and its “ greatest Principle, that of *Love*, reject- “ ed and expos'd.”

‘ Upon the whole then, we may justly ‘ as well as charitably conclude, that it is ‘ truely *our Author*'s Design, in applying ‘ himself with so much Fairness to the ‘ Men of looser Principles, to lead 'em ‘ into such an Apprehension of the Consti- ‘ tution of Mankind and of human Af-

‘ fairs

' fairs, as might form in 'em a Notion
' of *Order in Things*, and draw hence an
' Acknowledgement of that Wisdom,
' Goodness and Beauty, which is supreme;
' that being thus far become Proselytes,
' they might be prepar'd for that *divine*
' *Love* which our Religion wou'd teach
' 'em, when once they should embrace its
' Precepts, and form themselves to its
' sacred Character. Thus THEOCLES.

I might also refer you to what is said in the *Inquiry concerning Virtue*, (particularly from *P.* 57 to *P.* 67) with Respect to the Use of future Rewards and Punishments, to encourage, support, and assist a virtuous Practice: From which I shall only transcribe this one Passage, which is sufficient to vindicate the Gospel-discovery of a future Happiness, in the true Notion of it, from the Imputation of promoting a mere mercenary Obedience.

' In the Case of Religion, it must be
' considered, that if by the *Hope of Re-*
' *ward* be understood the Love and Desire
' of virtuous Enjoyment, or, of the very
' Practice and Exercise of Virtue in ano-
' ther Life; (and is not this the true No-
tion Christianity gives us of the Happiness

of Heaven?) the Expectation or Hope of ‘ this Kind is *so far from being derogatory* to ‘ Virtue, that it is an Evidence of our ‘ loving it the more sincerely, and *for its* ‘ *own Sake*.

And thus we have a sufficient Answer from my Lord *Shaftsbury* himself, and in his own Words, to whatever is pretended to be said against him in the third Dialogue of *Alciphron*: Of which I may venture to say further, That it contains a far more true and rational Defence of Religion and Christianity (particularly for setting in a just Light one great Design of the Christian Revelation, the Discovery of Life and Immortality) than any Thing that DION has put in the Mouths of his two *obsequious Puppets*, *Euphranor* and *Crito*.

§ IV. And this puts me in Mind to go on with my Design; and desire you, in the *next* Place, to look into the Author of *ALCIPHRON*'s own Way of defending Religion, and supporting Virtue by future Rewards, while he *decries* its Worth and Excellency; and see whether that too be not plainly foretold in the following Words. (*Charact. V.* I. *P.* 97, 98.)

‘ By

'By the best of my Observation, I have 'learn'd, that Virtue is never such a Suf- 'ferer by being *contested*, as by being be- 'trayed.

'I have known a Building, which, by 'the Officiousness of the Workmen has 'been so *shor'd* and *screw'd up* on the Side 'where they pretended it had a Leaning, 'that it has at last been turn'd the contra- 'ry Way, and overthrown. There has 'something perhaps of this Kind happen- 'ed in *Morals*. Men have not been con- 'tented to shew the natural Advantages of 'Honesty and Virtue. They have rather 'lessen'd these, the better, *as they thought*, 'to advance another Foundation. They 'have made *Virtue* so mercenary a Thing, 'and have talk'd so much of its *Rewards*, 'that one can hardly tell what there is 'in it, after all, which can be worth re- 'warding. For to be brib'd *only* or ter- 'rify'd into an honest Practice, bespeaks 'little of real Honesty or Worth. We 'may make, 'tis true, whatever *Bargain* 'we think fit, and may bestow *in Favour* 'what Overplus we please. But there 'can be no Excellence or Wisdom in vo- 'luntarily rewarding what is neither esti-

' mable nor deſerving. And if Virtue be
' not really eſtimable in itſelf, I can ſee
' nothing eſtimable in following it for the
' Sake of *a Bargain.*

' If the Love of doing Good, be not,
' of itſelf, a *good* and *right* Inclination;
' I know not how there can poſſibly be
' ſuch a Thing as *Goodneſs* or *Virtue.* If
' the Inclination be *right*; tis a perverting
' of it, to apply it *ſolely* to the *Reward*,
' and make us conceive ſuch Wonders of
' the Grace and Favour which is to attend
' Virtue; when there is ſo little ſhewn of
' the intrinſick Worth or Value of the
' Thing itſelf.

§ V. I might adduce ſeveral like Inſtances of my Lord *Shaftsbury*'s Foreſight, with reſpect to this ſame Book; but, not to weary you, I ſhall conclude with this One. Can any One conſider what a Hotch-potch and Medley this Author has made of his Book; and not ſee it prophetically deſcrib'd (*Char.* Vol. 3. *p.* 5, 6, 7.)

' A Manner is invented to confound
' Simplicity and Conformity of Deſign.
' *Patch-work* is ſubſtituted, *Cuttings* and
' *Shreds* of Learning, with various *Frag-*

' *ments*,

'*ments*, and *Points* of Wit, are drawn toge-
'ther, and tack'd in any fantastick Form.
'If they chance to cast a *Lustre*, and spread
'a Sort of sprightly *Glare*; the MISCEL-
'LANY is approv'd, and the *complex* Form
'and Texture of the Work admir'd. The
'Eye is by this Means pleasingly drawn
'aside, to commit a Kind of *Debauch*, and
'amuse itself in gaudy Colours, and dis-
'figur'd Shapes of Things. The *Wild* and
'*Whimsical*, under the Name of the *Odd*
'and *Pretty*, succeed in the Room of the
'*Graceful* and the *Beautiful*. Justness and
'Accuracy of Thought are set aside, as too
'constraining, and of too painful an As-
'pect, to be endur'd in the agreeable and
'more easy Commerce of modern *Wit*.

'Whatever is *capricious* and *odd*, is sure
'to create *Diversion*, to those who look
'no further. And where there is nothing
'like *Nature*, there is no Room for the
'troublesome Part of *Thought* or *Contem-*
'*plation*. 'Tis the Perfection of certain
'*Grotesque*-Painters, to keep as far from
'Nature as possible. To find *a Likeness*
'in their Works is to find the greatest
'Fault imaginable. A natural *Connexion*
'is a Slur. A *Coherence*, a *Design*, a *Mean-*
'*ing*,

' *ing*, is against their Purpose, and destroys
' the very Spirit and Genius of their Work-
' manship.

' I could, perhaps, demonstrate from the
' Writings of *grave Divines*, " That the
" miscellaneous *Manner* is at present in
" the highest Esteem."

CONCLUSION.

Upon the whole, it may be abundantly evident, that *Crito* had no great Reason to speak so contemptibly as he does †, of my Lord *Shaftsbury*'s prophetical Faculty. But this is of a Piece with the Heavinesſ and Clumsinesſ of Underſtanding the Author had formerly bewray'd‡, in making *Alciphron* call the Paſſage *Crito* had read out of the SOLILOQUY, the Words of a *Critick moralizing in Proſe:* Whereas it may be plain to any one who conſiders them, and looks into the Connection *, that they are the Words of a *Conjurer dealing with Spririts.*

Before I have done, there is one Obſervation I have made; which is ſo very remark-

† *Alciphr.* V. 1. Page 316. ‡ Page 314.
* See *Characteriſt.* V. 1. Page 318. Par. 2.

remarkable, that I cannot but lay it before you, *viz.* that this prophetical Faculty of my Lord *Shaftsbury*, particularly with respect to such Books and Authors as we have been speaking of, was not peculiar to himself; but we may find some Instances of it, in some of his earliest Disciples too. A memorable Instance of this Sort we have in a Piece publish'd above twenty Years ago, by a foreign *Divine*; who, after he has gi. a beautiful Abridgement and Elogium, of the SOLILOQUY, or *Advice to an Author*; concludes with these Words *

'*Tous les honêtes gens*, &c. All honest 'Men will willingly subscribe to these 'Truths: But *there will always be found* 'learned Men, whose Heart filled with 'Pride and Blindness, will not suffer them 'to profit, either by their reading, or by 'Converse with the World. These Men, 'whom haughty and brutal Manners don't 'suffer us to believe that they so much as 'suspect themselves to be liable to Mi-'stakes, deserve to be treated with the 'Contempt of those who *understand Life*.'

APEN-

* Biblioth. Choisie, par le Clerc. Tom. 21. par. 1. page 196.

APPENDIX.

AFTER all that the Writer of the above Papers has ſaid, to eſtabliſh the prophetical Faculty of the late Earl of *Shaftsbury*; I am apt to think that all the Paſſages he has produc'd in Proof of it, may be accounted for by mere human Fore-ſight and Sagacity; without having Recourſe to any ſuch extraordinary and miraculous Power of fore-telling Things to come, as he would ſeem to aſcribe it to.

What confirms me in this Thought is; that my Lord *Shaftsbury* has met with as bad Treatment from others, from whom ordinary human Fore-ſight could not have expected it, as from the Author of *Alciphron*; which, yet we don't find he has foretold; as he might eaſily have done, had he been endow'd with any extraordinary Talent that Way. It was eaſy, without either a Spirit of Prophecy, or conjur-

ing, to foresee how he would, in all Likelihood, be treated by Persons of a priestly Disposition; who, by an aukward Sort of Education, and an unaccountable Turn of Mind, were rendered uncapable of understanding the plain and strong Sense contained in his admirable Writings: But that he should meet with as base and injurious Treatment, from Persons of a philosophical Turn; who discovered a great Understanding of his Writings; and, if borrowing and espousing his Notions, might be taken for a Sign of Approbation, approv'd his Sentiments concerning Virtue; this was indeed a Thing that could scarce have been expected; and can hardly be believ'd, by any who have not seen it: And yet this has happened.

A memorable Instance of this Kind, we have in the Reverend Mr. *Butler*: Who, after he had plumed himself up in the borrowed Feathers of Lord *Shaftsbury*; and published a Volume of curious and elaborate Discourses, under the Title of *Sermons*, wherein it may be evident to any one who reads both, that he has borrowed almost all his Light and Discoveries from him,

 without

without ever making the leaſt Acknowledgment to him; has in a ſecond Edition, publiſh'd a Preface; in which he has miſrepreſented him in the groſſeſt Manner, and ſo as it is hard for any Man to help thinking the Miſrepreſentations to be wilful and deſign'd.

The firſt of them is in *P.* 17. of that *Preface*: Where he ſays; " The not taking " into Conſideration this Authority (of " Conſcience) which is implied in the Idea " of reflex Approbation or Diſapprobation, " ſeems a material Deficiency or Omiſſion " in *Lord* Shaftsbury's *Enquiry concerning* " *Virtue.* He has ſhewn beyond all Con- " tradiction, that Virtue is naturally the " Intereſt or Happineſs, and Vice the Mi- " ſery of ſuch a Creature as Man, placed " in the Circumſtances which we are in, " in this World. But ſuppoſe there are " particular Exceptions; a Caſe which " this Author was unwilling to put, and " yet ſurely is to be put; or ſuppoſe a Caſe " which he has put and determined, that " of a Sceptick not convinced of this hap- " py Tendency of Virtue, or being of a " contrary Opinion. His Determination

' is,

" is, that 'twould be *without Remedy* *." But pray, what Shadow of Ground had he to assert, that my Lord *Shaftsbury* did not take that Authority of Conscience into Consideration, or was guilty of any Omission through such a Neglect? What has this Author said through all his laboured Talk, either here or in his Sermons, concerning the natural Supremacy or Authority of Conscience; which Lord *S*——*y* had not said more clearly and strongly before him? He repeats indeed, I don't know how many Times over, *the natural Supremacy of Conscience*; and uses other various Phrases to express it by: But his Proofs of the Notion are very sparingly and very obscurely hinted: Nothing near so clearly laid down to that Purpose, as we have in the following Paragraphs of my Lord *Shaftsbury*; which I shall here set down, that it may appear,

Quanto rectius hic, qui nil moliter inepte.

How beautifully does he show, in the following Paragraph, that One's Conscience will not permit him to be guilty of *the least known*

* Characteristicks, V. 2, p. 69.

known Villany, without disquieting and punishing him for it? V. 1. *p.* 130, 131, 132. " He who would enjoy *a Freedom of Mind*, " and be truly *Possessor of himself*, must be " above the Thought of stooping to what " is villanous or base. He, on the other " Side, who has a Heart to stoop, must " necessarily quit the Thought of —— *a* " *Character with himself*. —— To pretend " to enjoy *a free Mind*, in Company with " *a knavish Heart*, is as ridiculous as the " Way of Children, who eat their Cake, " and afterwards cry for it. —— True In- " terest is wholly on *one* Side (that of " Knavery) or *the other* (that of Honesty) " all between is Inconsistency, Irresoluti- " on, Remorse, Vexation —— a perpe- " tual Discord of Life; and an alternate " Disquiet and Self-dislike. The only Rest " or Repose must be thro' *one* determin'd " considerate Resolution; which once " taken, must be courageously kept; and " the Passions and Affections brought un- " der Obedience to it; the Temper steel'd " and harden'd to the Mind; the Disposi- " tion to the Judgment, both must agree; " else all must be Disturbance and Confu- " sion. So that to think with One's self,

" in

" in good Earneſt, "" Why may not One
"" do this *little* Villany, or commit this *one*
"" Treachery, and but for *once*;"" is the
" moſt ridiculous Imagination in the
" World, and contrary to COMMON
" SENSE." He who can't ſee the *natural Supremacy of Conſcience* here, muſt be able to underſtand nothing but what is expreſs'd in his own Cant-Stile; or muſt be much like the Man, who *could not ſee the Wood for the Trees.*

Again, How clearly and elegantly does Lord *S*——*y* ſhow; that the Checks and Reproofs of One's own Conſcience are naturally ſtronger, than his Senſe of the greateſt Shame and Odium from others? V. 1. *p.* 171, 172, 173. "Let the airy
" Gentleman, who makes bold with others,
" retire a while out of Company; and he
" ſcarce dares tell himſelf his Wiſhes.
" Much leſs can he endure to carry on
" his Thought, as he neceſſarily muſt, if he
" enters once thorowly *into himſelf.*——
" We may defend Villany, or cry up Fol-
" ly, before the World: But to appear
" Fools, Madmen, or Varlets, to *ourſelves*;
" and prove it to our own Faces, that we
" are really *ſuch*, is unſupportable. For
" ſo

" ſo true a Reverence has every One for
" himſelf, when he comes clearly to ap-
" pear before his *cloſe Companion*, that he
" had rather profeſs the vileſt Things of
" himſelf in open Company, than hear his
" Character privately from his own Mouth.
" So that —— the chief Intereſt of ——
" every ſly inſinuating *Vice*, is to prevent
" this Interview and Familiarity of Diſ-
" courſe which is conſequent upon cloſe
" Retirement and inward Receſs."

Again, Does he not, in the *Inquiry concerning Virtue*, ſhow how natural and eſſential to our Frame a moral Senſe is? Which, as it has a Reſpect to our own Actions, is the ſame Thing with Conſcience, or the Foundation of it. V. 2. *p.* 43. "'Tis im-
" poſſible to conceive, that a rational Crea-
" ture coming firſt to be tried by rational
" Objects, and receiving into his Mind the
" Images or Repreſentations of Juſtice,
" Generoſity, Gratitude, or other Virtue,
" ſhould have no *Liking* of theſe, or *Diſlike*
" of their Contraries; but be found abſo-
" lutely indifferent towards whatſoever is
" preſented to him of this Sort. A Soul,
" indeed, may as well be without *Senſe*,
" as without Admiration in the Things of

" which

" which it has any Knowledge. —— It
" must needs find a Beauty and a Defor-
" mity as well in Actions, Minds and Tem-
" pers, as in Figures, Sounds or Colours."
But, what need I be bringing particular Quotations to this Purpose, out of this Book; a great Part of the main Purpose of which, is to place the very Notion of Virtue in *a Conformity of all our Affections and Actions to this moral Sense?* I shall only observe how admirably the whole Force of Conscience, and Strength of the Excitements to an exactly regular and virtuous Conduct arising from it, is *there* set forth in a few Words; from *p.* 118. to *p.* 124. 'Twould be too long to transcribe the whole Passage: I shall therefore only set down the Parts which principally belong to the Purpose, of showing whether my Lord *S*——*y* has not taken the Authority of Conscience into Consideration, in his *Enquiry concerning Virtue.* " A Creature, such as Man, must in
" the very Use of his reasoning Faculty,
" be forc'd to receive Reflections back into
" his Mind of what passes in itself, as well
" as in the Affections or Will; in short, of
" whatever relates to his Character, Con-
" duct, or Behaviour amidst his Fellow-
" Creatures,

" Creatures, and in Society.—— Now as
" nothing can be more grievous than this
" is, to One who has thrown off *natural*
" *Affection*; so nothing can be more de-
" lightful to One who has preserv'd it with
" Sincerity.—— To a rational Creature it
" must be horridly offensive and grievous,
" — to have the Reflection in his Mind of
" any *unjust* Action or Behaviour, which
" he knows to be naturally *odious* and *ill-*
" *deserving*. This is alone properly call'd
" CONSCIENCE.—— *Religious Conscience*
" —— has its Force from the apprehended
" moral Deformity and Odiousness of any
" Act, with respect purely to the divine
" Presence, and the natural Veneration due
" to such a Being. For in such a Presence,
" the Shame of Villany or Vice must have
" its Force, independently on that further
" Apprehension of the magisterial Capa-
" city of such a Being, and his Dispensa-
" tion of particular Rewards or Punish-
" ments in a future State.—— No Crea-
" ture can maliciously and intentionally *do*
" *ill*, without being sensible, at the same
" Time, that he *deserves Ill*. And in this
" Respect, every sensible Creature may be
" said to have *Conscience*. For with all

 " Mankind,

" Mankind, and all intelligent Creatures,
" this muſt ever hold, "" That *what* they
""" know, they deſerve from every one
""" *that* they neceſſarily muſt fear and ex-
""" pect from all.""" And thus, Suſpicions
" and ill Apprehenſions muſt ariſe, with
" Terrors, both of Men and of the DEI-
" TY. But beſides this, there muſt in e-
" very rational Creature, be yet farther
" *Conſcience*; *viz.* from Senſe of *Deformity*
" *in what is thus ill-deſerving and unnatural*;
" and from *a conſequent Shame or Regret of*
" *incurring what is odious, and moves Aver-*
" *ſion.* There ſcarcely is, or can be any
" Creature, whom Conſciouſneſs of Villa-
" ny, *as ſuch merely*, does not at all offend.
" —— Where *Conſcience*, or *Senſe* of this
" Sort, remains; there whatever is com-
" mitted againſt it, muſt of Neceſſity, by
" means of Reflection, be continually
" ſhameful, grievous and offenſive.---There
" is nothing beſide real Virtue, which can
" poſſibly hold any Proportion to Eſteem,
" Approbation or good Conſcience. And
" he who being led by falſe Religion or pre-
" vailing Cuſtom, has learn'd to eſteem or
" admire any Thing as Virtue which is
" not really ſuch; muſt either thro' the

" Incon-

" Inconſiſtency of ſuch an Eſteem, and by
" the perpetual Immoralities occaſion'd by
" it, come at laſt to loſe all Conſcience,
" and ſo be miſerable in the worſt Way:
" Or, if he retains any Conſcience at all,
" it muſt be of a Kind never ſatisfactory,
" or able to beſtow Content.——Nor
" can any One, who, by any pretended
" Authority, commits *one ſingle* Immora-
" lity, be able to ſatisfy himſelf with any
" Reaſon, why he ſhould not at another
" Time be carried further into all Manner
" of Villany; ſuch perhaps, as he even
" abhors to think of. And this is a Re-
" proach which a Mind muſt of Neceſſi-
" ty make to itſelf upon *the leaſt* Violation
" of natural Conſcience; in doing what is
" *morally deform'd and ill deſerving.*"

What, after all this, could be Mr. *Butler*'s meaning in aſſerting, that my Lord *S*——— had not *taken into Conſideration* the Authority of Conſcience in his *Enquiry concerning Virtue?* Unleſs it was vainly to arrogate to himſelf that Notion of the *Power or Supremacy of Conſcience*, as his own Invention or Diſcovery, when 'tis eaſy to ſee whence he had borrowed that,

as well as moſt of the other Notions he had made ſuch a Figure with.

But, what Abſurdity has he fallen into, thro' this ſuppos'd Omiſſion? Mr. *B.* owns, that "he has ſhewn *beyond all Contradiction* that Virtue is *naturally* the Happineſs, "and Vice the Miſery of Man." "But "ſuppoſe, ſays he, there are particular "Exceptions; a Caſe which this Author "was unwilling to put, and yet *ſurely is* "*to be put.*" Mr. *B.* may ſay ſo, if he pleaſes; but my Lord *S.* was not only *unwilling to put* ſuch a Caſe; but has plainly ſhown, in that *Enquiry*, that ſuch a Caſe *is not to be put*; that there are *no particular Exceptions* from this Rule, "that Virtue is "the Good, and Vice the Ill, of every "Man." Why then, ſays Mr. *B.* "Sup-"poſe a Caſe which he has put and deter-"mined, that of a Sceptick not convinc'd "of this happy Tendency of Virtue, or "being of a contrary Opinion. His De-"termination is, that 'twould be *without* "*Remedy.*" Now, let any one look into the Paſſage in my Lord *S.* which Mr. *B.* refers to (*Vol.* 2. *P.* 69.) and ſee whether this has not all the Appearance of *a wilful Miſrepreſentation*, whether my Lord

S——,

S——y there says *any Thing like* what is here asserted. What he there says, is plainly and expressly this, "ATHEISM is plainly "deficient and *without Remedy*, in the Case "of *ill Judgment on the Happiness of Vir-* "*tue*;" *i. e. it* affords no Remedy, in the Case of such ill Judgment; whereas THEISM, or the sound Belief of a God, does; as he had plainly shown above (*p.* 61, 62.) and repeats below (*p.* 71.) is this saying "that the Case suppos'd *would be without* "*Remedy?*" *Vestram fidem* all honest Men! Or would Mr. *B.* persuade us, "that the "Case must be *without Remedy*, unless *A-* "*theism* does afford it one?"

The other gross Misrepresentation is in *P.* 20 and 21. where, by a shallow and shameful Artifice, he would bear us in Hand, that my Lord *Shaftsbury* had asserted "that a perfectly wise and good Gover- "nour cannot punish *the Wicked*; nor is "there any Reason *for them* to fear Pu- "nishment from such a Governour:' Tho' my Lord *Shaftsbury* has very often and very clearly shown the contrary. Does he not, in the Passage I have quoted a few Pages backward, speak of the magiste-

"rial

"rial Capacity of the DEITY, and his "Dispensation of particular Rewards or "Punishments in a future State?" Does he not, in that Passage, assert that "*what* "Creatures know they deserve from eve- "ry one, *that* they necessarily must *fear* "and expect from all; and thus *Terrors* "must arise, both of Men and of the "DEITY?" Besides, in *Vol.* 2. *p.* 119, 120. there is this remarkable Passage: "To fear GOD *any otherwise than as in* "*Consequence of some justly blameable and* "*imputable Act*, is to fear *a devilish* Nature; "not *a divine* one: Nor does the Fear of "Hell, or a thousand *Terrors* of *the Deity*, "imply Conscience; (*N. B.*) *unless where* "*there is an Apprehension of what is wrong*, "*odious, morally deformed, and ill-deserv-* "*ing*:" And *where this is the Case*, there "*Conscience* must have Effect, and *Punish-* "*ment of Necessity be apprehended*; even "tho' it be not expressly threatn'd." Again "*p.* 125. "Even where there is no Sense "of moral Deformity, as *such merely*; there "must be still a Sense of the *ill Merit* of "it *with Respect to God* and Man." I might mention several other Passages, and much larger ones, to the same Purpose:

But

But these may suffice; and are abundantly plain.

One may justly wonder, after all this, what could induce any Author to impute to my Lord *Shaftsbury* so absurd a Notion; and which he had so often and clearly confuted: Or rather, what Art Mr. *B.* could fall upon, to palm upon us such an Absurdity for my Lord *Shaftsbury's*. Why he runs away with a single Sentence; *it is Malice only, and not Goodness, which can make us afraid*; (which he quotes from *Characteristi* V. 1. *p.* 39.) where, without the least Shadow of Reason, nay contrary to the whole Strain of that Paragraph where the Words occur, by *us* he will have to be understood *wicked Men*; a Race among whom my Lord *Shaftsbury* did not use to rank himself, so as to speak of them in the first Person plural; nor can I find that he had any Reason to do so.

But, let us hear Mr. *B.* "And here, "says he, it comes in one's Way to take "Notice of a manifest Error or Mistake, "in the Author now cited:" But how *comes it in one's Way*? Has this any Thing to do with the Argument he is upon, about the *Supremacy of Conscience*?

No:

No: But his Hand was in at misrepresenting this great Man; and he must go on with it, it seems: But here the Author seems to hesitate a little, and speaks somewhat doubtfully: "Unless, says he, per-"haps he has incautiously expressed him-"self so as to be misunderstood:" But it had been quite as modest to have said, *Unless perhaps I have misunderstood him*, without throwing the Blame on his having *incautiously expressed himself*; but, perhaps that was a Fact our Author durst not *expresly* assert. But, what is this Error? "namely, that *it is Malice only, and not* "*Goodness, which can make us afraid:*" In Opposition to which, our Author asserts; That "in Reality, Goodness is the natu-"ral and just Object of the greatest Fear "*to an ill Man:*" Which he proves well enough in the following Words; as indeed 'twas very easy to do: But, why is this asserted, and prov'd, as against my Lord *Shaftsbury?* How does it appear that by *us*, in that Passage the Author refers to, he meant *ill Men?* Is it not, on the contrary, evident from the whole Connection with what goes before, that he is speaking of *honest Men*; who yet might be apt, through

through Weakness, to ascribe the Frailties of human Nature to the DEITY; and from these Mis-conceptions, raise in themselves groundless Fears of HIM; which he is endeavouring to cure, by correcting those wrong Conceptions whence they arise? Had he not above, in the Course of the very Reasoning he is there upon, thus clearly and plainly expressed himself? (*p.*35.) "It is impossible that any besides an ill-"natur'd Man can wish against the Being "of a GOD:——But if a Man has not "any such Ill-will to stifle his Belief, he "must have surely an unhappy Opinion of "GOD, and believe him not so good by "far as he knows *himself* to be, if he ima-"gines that an impartial Use of his Rea-"son, in any Matter of Speculation what-"soever, can make him run any Risk here-"after:" Is not this the *Fear* he is speaking of; and concerning which he says, *It is Malice only, and not Goodness, that can make us afraid?* Or, as himself well expresses it, in the Passage cited above, *p.* 88, One's "fearing *otherwise than as in Consequence* "*of some justly blameable and imputable Act:*" and not an *ill Man's* Fear of *just Punishment.* Mr. *B.* goes on: "It is said, That *the In-*

" *tereſt or Good of the whole, muſt be the In-*
" *tereſt of the univerſal Being, and that he*
" *can have no other.* Be it ſo. This Au-
" thor has proved, that Vice is naturally
" the Miſery of Mankind in this World.
" Conſequently it was for the Good of the
" whole, that it ſhould be ſo. What Sha-
" dow of Reaſon then is there to aſſert,
" that this may not be the Caſe hereafter?"
And what Shadow of Reaſon, ſay I, is
there to pretend, or inſinuate, that my
Lord *Shaftsbury* ever had aſſerted this? He
who, long before Mr. *B.* had expreſly ad-
duced that very Conſideration, of the pre-
ſent natural Tendency of Vice, as a *Proof*
of a *future State*! Thus, in a ſtrong and
beautiful Manner, he expreſſes himſelf
(Vol. 2. *p.* 275.) " If Virtue be to itſelf
" no ſmall Reward, and *Vice* in a great
" Meaſure *'tis own Puniſhment*; we have *a*
" *ſolid Ground* to go upon. The plain
" Foundations of a diſtributive Juſtice,
" and due Order in this World, may lead
" us to conceive a *further Building.* We
" apprehend a *larger Scheme*, and eaſily re-
" ſolve ourſelves why Things were not
" compleated in this State; but their Ac-
" compliſhment reſerv'd rather to ſome
" *further*

" *further Period*, &c." Mr. *B*. concludes: " Danger of future Punishment no more " supposes Malice, than the present feeling " of Punishment does:" And it evidently appears that my Lord *Shaftsbury* was uncapable of imagining *that it does*.

Upon the Whole, now, I think I may leave it to any understanding and impartial Person to judge, whether these two gross Misrepresentations of my Lord *Shaftsbury* I have now been considering, have not a strong Appearance of being wilful and designed Ones: Especially in a Person of Mr. *B*'s good Sense; who discovers himself so well acquainted with my Lord *Shaftsbury*'s Writings, and so capable of understanding them; and who must have had the Passages misrepresented standing in their Connection before his Eyes, as appears by his referring to the very Places where they stand, and quoting so much of the express Words as he thought would most plausibly appear to bear those Constructions he intended to put upon them.

What greatly aggravates such Treatment from Mr. *B*. is, that all the World saw, from the first Edition of his Sermons,

whence he had borrowed the chief Matter of these elaborate Discourses. I must own it was somewhat surprizing to me, upon the first reading of them, that he had not found himself obliged to make some grateful Acknowledgement to my Lord *Shaftsbury*, for the considerable Assistance he ow'd to him. 'Twas somewhat hard to think, that the obnoxious Character my Lord *Shaftsbury* had got among many Clergymen (with what Justice, I am not now to examine) should render it dangerous for any of the Cloath to own what *Good* they had received from him. I find too, that such Acknowledgments have been made to him, particularly by the Reverend Dr. *Fiddes*.

However, as this was only an Omission, I was ready to make the best Excuse for it I could: Perhaps, it might be undesigned; or flow from Forgetfulness: Or, perhaps, Mr. *B.* might have his particular Reasons for it. But when a Caution of this Sort carries a Man not only to Omissions but to actual Injuries, 'tis utterly inexcusable: 'Tis hard to find any account for it, but such a One as *Cowley* furnishes us with, in his Paraphrase upon the 2d *Olymp. Ode* of *Pindar*.

In this thankless World the Givers
Are envy'd even by the Receivers;
Now 'tis the cheap and frugal Fashion
Rather to hide *than* pay *an Obligation:*
Nay, 'tis much worse than so; (owe.
We do ill Turns, lest Men should think we

But, I would gladly suppress such Suspicions as do most naturally arise from the first Reflections on so strange a Conduct; and entertain better Thoughts of a Person who has wrote so well of CONSCIENCE as Mr. *B.* And therefore, as he has well observed *, "That the very Constitution "of our Nature requires that we bring our "whole Conduct before this superior Fa-"culty;" I would advise him, as a Friend, to put his Doctrine in Practice; to take a Review of this Part of his Conduct, I have been animadverting upon, and bring it before that superior Faculty: And if, upon such a Review of it, his CONSCIENCE lets him go, without making an open Acknowledgement and Retraction of such gross Injuries; I doubt some People will have

* Preface, p. 16.

have but a very indifferent Opinion of his practical Regard to his inward MONITOR.

N. B. The Quotations from the CHARACTERISTICKS, in the above Pieces, are from the ſecond Edition of that Book.

Adver-

Advertiſement.

Shortly will be publiſhed,

THE CHARACTERISTICKS *transverſed*; or, the whole Works of the late Earl of *Shaftsbury* tranſlated into heroick Verſe: By *Dion*.

A Specimen of the Verſification.

BUT here a buſy Form ſolicites us,
Active, induſtrious, watchful and deſpiſing
Pains and Labour. She wears the ſerious
Countenance of Virtue, but with Features
Of Anxiety and Diſquiet.
What is't ſhe mutters? What looks ſhe on with
Such Admiration and Aſtoniſhment?
Bags! Coffers! Heaps of ſhining Metal! What?
For the Service of Luxury? For her?
Theſe Preparations? Art thou then her Friend,
Grave Fancy! Is it for her thou toileſt?
No, but for Proviſion againſt Want.
But Luxury apart! tell me now,
Haſt thou not already a Competence?

This

This curious Work, to which it is expected all the *Virtuosi* will give due Encouragement, is to be perform'd with a Pair of Scissars; and, being already well advanced, may in a few Weeks be fit for the Press.

N. B. The learned *SCRIBLERUS*, having perused some Sheets of the above Work in MSS. return'd them with this Remark: "From this "admirable Work it will ap- "pear what silly Mortals the most "Part of Men are; who have spo- "ken all their Life grovelling "Prose; when they might very "easily, by observing the simple "Rule of making proper Stops at "the End of such a Number of "Syllables, have talk't in lofty "Heroicks."

F I N I S.

ERRATA. Page 37. Line 2. for *Dean* read *Dion*.